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FOREWORD
The American military’s attitude towards reconstruction has been ambivalent, to say the least. In the
aftermath of World War II, the successful rebuilding
of Western Europe that was the result of the carefully crafted and skillfully executed Marshall Plan was
one of the most significant achievements of the 20th
century. But in the wake of the Vietnam experience,
reconstruction became an undertaking to be avoided
at almost any cost. “Nation building” became a pejorative expression in the lexicon of the military and
policymakers.
All that seems to have changed since the attacks
of September 11, 2001. The experience on the ground
gained by Army forces in two major counterinsurgency operations has proved that reconstruction designed
to win the support of a population away from the enemy is an integral part of a successful counterinsurgency strategy. The publication of new Army doctrine
followed and codified this reshaping of our thinking
about reconstruction and its relationship to counterinsurgency warfare.
But the matter of maximizing the effectiveness of
a reconstruction effort undertaken as part of a counterinsurgency campaign is still very much at issue.
It is not clear from our doctrine that we really have
a clear concept for how to undertake reconstruction,
nor do we have a common understanding across the
force of what its component activities are, who should
be responsible for them, or what specific capabilities
need to be resident in our Army units to accomplish
the necessary component tasks.
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In this monograph, Eric T. Olson first provides
some historical context, tracking the role that reconstruction has played in military operations from the
War in the Philippines to the conflicts that are ongoing today. This is followed by a doctrinal treatment
that lays the ground work for an analysis of how we
think about reconstruction, the way that we execute it,
and the challenges that we face in doing so. Mr. Olson
concludes his discussion with recommendations for
enhancing the Army’s ability to realize the full potential of reconstruction as a critical contributing factor in
a larger counterinsurgency campaign.
There seems to be no end in sight to the long war
in which the Army currently finds itself taking part.
To the degree that battles of this war will be fought as
counterinsurgencies, this monograph establishes an
important starting point for discussions about how to
conduct the campaign more effectively.
		

			
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

vi

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
ERIC T. OLSON, was the Deputy Director of the
Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, Civil-Military Affairs in the U.S. Embassy, Baghdad from 200607. Following that, from 2007-08 he served as the Chief
of Staff and Principal Advisor to the Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction. An Army officer for
34 years, he commanded infantry units at all levels
from platoon to division, achieving the rank of major general and serving his last 3 years as the Commanding General of the 25th Infantry Division (Light),
which included duty as the Commander of Combined
Joint Task Force-76, during Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM in Afghanistan (2004-05).

vii

SUMMARY
If the U.S. Army’s current experience in ongoing
overseas operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan are any indication, reconstruction has become an
integral part of the American way of war. And judging from the disappointing results of reconstruction
efforts in these operations, measured mostly in terms
of the effect that such efforts have had on the course
of these wars, there is much lacking in the Army’s understanding of reconstruction itself and the role that it
will likely play in all future operations, especially in
counterinsurgencies (COIN).
Reconstruction is defined in current Army doctrine
as “the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged,
or destroyed political, socioeconomic, and physical
infrastructure of a country or territory to create the
foundation for long-term development.” The term itself has been used in the recounting of the history of
U.S. warfare for quite some time, most notably first
applied to the period of rebuilding after the Civil War.
The Marshall Plan and associated activities that took
place in Europe and Japan in the wake of World War
II represent reconstruction’s finest hour.
But it is only recently that reconstruction has been
viewed as an integral part of operations that are under
way as opposed to some sort of post-conflict or postcrisis activity. During the U.S. invasion and subsequent occupation of the Philippines at the turn of the
20th century, Brigadier General James F. Smith used
the term “benevolent assimilation” to describe his approach to winning over the population as he battled
rebel forces in the subdistrict of Negros. His view was
that securing the population and taking action to establish good governance and stability and address the
ix

pressing basic needs of the people were perhaps more
important than combat operations against the insurgents with whom his forces were engaged. But despite
the demonstrated success of this approach in America’s “small wars” of the 20th century, embracing reconstruction as an essential part of warfare has been
the exception as opposed to the rule. Often decried as
“nation building,” reconstruction more often than not
has been viewed as an activity to be avoided—a mission that would undermine the primary role of U.S.
forces as “warfighters.”
Recently published doctrine for U.S. forces sends
the strong signal that the U.S. Army is unequivocally
in the business of nation-building if we are to prosecute successful COIN campaigns. Field Manual (FM)
3-0, Operations, includes a discussion of reconstruction
as inextricably linked to counterinsurgency—a form
of irregular warfare that is one of the manual’s operational themes. In Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability
Operations, the term reconstruction is defined for the
first time ever in U.S. Army doctrine and discussed
extensively throughout the manual. But it is in Field
Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, that the importance, if not preeminence, of reconstruction is most
clearly stated, captured explicitly in the observation in
the manual that “some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot.”1
That said, descriptions of reconstruction in Army
doctrine fall short on several counts. First, there is
still some conceptual confusion in the definition of
reconstruction and its further specification that the
new doctrine presumably was meant to clear up. The
treatment of reconstruction in the manuals includes
discussion of an overwhelming number of tasks and,
raises questions about prioritization and responsibili-

x

ties for their accomplishment. Most critically, none of
the manuals includes a description of a concept of reconstruction, thereby leaving a void for commanders
in the field who are seeking guidelines for the integration of reconstruction with other activities that are
associated with COIN.
Working from the assumption that some of the
shortcomings of Army doctrine are being compensated for by practitioners in current operations, a simple
tabletop exercise was conducted in the Spring of 2009
to examine how reconstruction is presently being executed as part of COIN. Participants were solicited
based on their knowledge of and experience in the key
agencies involved in past and likely future reconstruction operations. To generate feedback from player
agencies, a base scenario was designed that described
conditions in a nation typical of those found by U.S.
forces in recent and ongoing overseas operations, and
which are likely to be similar to those that will be encountered during future operations. The results of the
exercise demonstrate that there is little disagreement
among the key players in reconstruction operations
about what the critical tasks are or even how to prioritize them, but that there is a need for some articulation of how to organize and coordinate reconstruction
operations beyond what exists now in doctrine or applicable governmental directives.
Establishing an agreed upon framework for reconstruction in COIN which is accepted by the participating agencies will go a long way toward addressing
the shortcomings, conceptual confusion, and missing
clarity that has characterized such efforts to date. A
concept of reconstruction that is constructed along the
same lines as other operational concepts that are prevalent in Army doctrine would provide such a frame-
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work. Such an operational concept might include as
components a statement of the purpose of reconstruction, a description of its essential elements, a general
sequence and scheme of reconstruction activities, and
guidelines for assigning responsibilities and assessment of a reconstruction effort.
Once such a framework is in place and the role of
key players is more clearly established, it will be important for the Army to look for ways to make reconstruction a more effective component of its counterinsurgency operations—both to increase the likelihood
of successful campaigns and to reduce some of the toll
that counterinsurgency campaigns are taking on our
servicemen and women.
There are some fundamental reforms that must
be considered that could add significantly to Army
capabilities to conduct reconstruction. Some of these
involve interagency reforms, the most important being a shared understanding of a reconstruction concept across agencies, roles and responsibilities that are
more appropriately assigned to and accepted by them,
and an enhanced operational focus in those agencies
which are instrumental to reconstruction that would
allow them to deploy in greater numbers earlier on in
a campaign. But the Army as a key player in reconstruction as part of COIN, must reexamine its capabilities to participate in a broad interagency effort, or to
act alone when that seems appropriate or necessary.
Some areas that will need to be addressed are the
current approach to training and otherwise preparing
for reconstruction in counterinsurgency operations,
the adequacy of capabilities that are currently resident
in Army units to execute key reconstruction, and the
Army’s current ability and approach to setting conditions for the success of its interagency partners.
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Even under the best circumstances, reconstruction
in COIN is a difficult endeavor. The most critical tasks
are numerous and complex. Many participating agencies must undertake missions that fall well out of their
existing core competencies or operate in environments
that are completely unfamiliar to them. The involvement of multiple agencies which are not accustomed
to working together makes coordination difficult. And
all this must take place in an environment where an
armed, violent foe understands the disadvantage to
him of a successful reconstruction effort and is determined to go to almost any length to resist progress or
destroy what has been accomplished.
In an assessment of an ongoing counterinsurgency
operation, General David H. Petraeus observed that
“hard is not hopeless.”2 Extending this logic, it can be
said that reconstruction in COIN is hard, but it becomes
less hopeless if the counterinsurgent understands
what needs to be accomplished and to what end, and
he has a plan and can mount a coordinated effort to
execute that plan. If so executed, reconstruction can
indeed become one of the array of key weapons that
do not shoot available to the counterinsurgent.
But even as a weapon that does not shoot, reconstruction can end up being dangerous to the hunter
as well as the hunted. The counterinsurgent’s ultimate
objectives are a manageable security environment and
strong national institutions that have the confidence
and the support of the people. A coordinated, skillfully executed reconstruction program is essential to
those ends. But reconstruction that is mismanaged,
bungled, and obviously ineffectual not only represents a lost opportunity to advance the cause; it also
may well put a weapon in the hands of the insurgent.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2006, violence in Iraq was at near
record highs, and pressure from Washington to show
some progress in reducing it was mounting. Though
there were some reasons for hope based on developments in the outlying provinces (for example, early
signs of the Sunni awakening were being recognized),
the situation in Baghdad seemed to get worse every
day. The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Force
Commander of the Multinational Force decided that
a change in strategy was necessary. Whereas to this
point the approach had been to be strong in as many
places as possible throughout Iraq and focus on turning provinces over to Iraqi control as soon as conditions allowed, the Force Commander decided that a
reduction in violence throughout Iraq had to begin
in Baghdad, the capital city with one-quarter of the
nation’s population. There, violence was raging unabated, and an all out civil war on top of an already
well-established, stubborn insurgency was seen as a
real possibility. This campaign to stabilize Iraq’s most
important metropolitan center became known the
“Baghdad Security Plan.”
As the heart of the Baghdad-focused strategy, a
classic counterinsurgency (COIN) approach was adopted by tactical units in the neighborhoods, which
became known by the mnemonic “clear, hold, build.”
The first step was to clear neighborhoods of insurgent
activity and the influence of sectarian extremists primarily by using U.S. forces to conduct combat operations against insurgent groups and violent militias.
The “hold phase” came next, with emphasis on main-
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taining security and stability in neighborhoods, using
Iraqi security forces wherever possible to accomplish
the task. Once the neighborhood was secured, the critical “build phase” was to begin. The concept was to
redouble efforts to undertake reconstruction projects,
focused especially on putting unemployed militaryaged males to work and restoring essential services
to the neighborhoods, but also to work with the local
population and government to strengthen institutions
and build capacity—reestablish the rule of law, improve governance, rekindle economic and commercial
activity, reopen banks and medical centers, and the
like. The outcome of the build phase was viewed as
decisive. By establishing a sense of normalcy in the local population, one that would convince them that life
would be much better if the neighborhood were kept
under the control of legitimate government authorities and away from the influence of the insurgents, a
successful build phase could make the hold phase a
less daunting task for security forces in the neighborhoods.
The strategy was sound, and the clear phase commenced with significant early success. Coalition forces
arriving in Baghdad and its bordering provinces began to push out into neighborhoods that had previously been considered firmly in the grip of various
insurgent and extremist groups—Al Qaeda in Iraq,
Sunni rejectionists, Shia militants, and several others.
But the campaign’s hold and build phases as originally conceived are broadly judged to have failed.
While U.S. forces were committed to clearing neighborhoods, Iraqi Army and National Police forces were
not equal to the task of securing them, meaning that
clearing forces often had to return to neighborhoods
or simply remain there in order to hold onto security
gains that had been so hard won.
2

This inability to hold was complicated by the fact
that the build phase floundered. Naturally, building
proved difficult in neighborhoods where instability
threatened. But it was not just a lack of security that
explains the failure to mount any significant reconstruction effort. Fundamental weaknesses in the planning and execution of the reconstruction effort in support of the Baghdad Security Plan were crippling. To
begin with, there was no reconstruction master plan
for Baghdad that was agreed to by those members of
the interagency community who had a reconstruction
mission and capabilities to carry it out. A clear, shared
vision of the purpose of reconstruction as it related to
the campaign was lacking. The effort was marked by
disorganization that was endemic throughout, and
there was a noticeable lack of coordination between
reconstruction agencies and organizations. There was
little to no integration of the various reconstruction
efforts and the military operations of forces that
were operating in the same neighborhoods. Money
was poured into projects and programs that were illconsidered, lacked the support of local officials and
authorities in Baghdad, and were poorly managed.
The program to build capacity in national ministries,
so critical to sustaining progress in Baghdad, was
being run in complete isolation from the local reconstruction efforts. As the build phase floundered and
sensing a vacuum in key reconstruction areas, the military began taking on reconstruction tasks for which
it had no particular experience or expertise, in some
cases making a bad situation worse.
An assessment of the state of reconstruction at the
time in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq is contained
in the Quarterly Report of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), dated January
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2007.1 Despite the massive energy being put into the
build phase in Baghdad, the report noted only “limited progress” in several identified key areas, among
them “ensuring the sustainability of reconstruction
programs and projects,” “building ministerial capacity,” and “improving coordination of all U.S. agencies involved in reconstruction.”2 In support of these
observations, SIGIR cited statistics showing that from
August through December 2006 (the first 6 months
of the Baghdad Security Plan), peak electrical power
generation actually decreased by 20 percent. Power
interruptions in Baghdad were common. At the end of
2006, on any given day, neighborhoods could expect
only 8 hours of electricity. Crude oil production, so
critical to funding the recovery of Baghdad and other
major cities in Iraq, showed no measureable increase
over the same time period, hovering at about one-half
million barrels per day below established production
targets which had been set at about 2.5 million barrels. Additionally, of the 126 health care facilities that
had been promised to the Iraqi people, most of them
in Baghdad, only seven had been opened by the end
of 2006.3
What many senior officials and planners had hoped
would become an upward spiral, as reconstruction in
cleared areas won over local residents and contributed
to more security, turned into the exact opposite. Disillusionment among the population who continued to
suffer from horrendous living conditions, unemployment and ineffective local government and administration fueled unrest, instability, and thus the insurgency. In short, after the Ambassador and the Force
Commander launched the Baghdad Security Plan as a
new COIN campaign based on a sort of three legged
stool—“Clear, Hold, Build”—the balance that needed
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to be struck between the legs to arrive at a successful
campaign proved impossible to achieve. As a result,
the violence in Baghdad continued to rage.
Reconstruction in one form or another has long
been a part of war. When viewed, for example, as
something that took place after conflict had subsided
to mend the horrific wounds of a nation that had been
ripped apart by civil war to make it whole again, or a
rebuilding of one-time foes so that they could serve
as part of the bulwark against an existential threat,
reconstruction efforts have been viewed as among
America’s greatest triumphs. But reconstruction has
also been reviled and repudiated as “nation-building”
and blamed as the cause of “mission creep,” held up
by critics as an activity inconsistent with the American
way of war.
Reconstruction has also gone by many names and
played an integral role in a wide range of military operations. At the turn of the 20th century, during the Philippine Wars, reconstruction was the centerpiece of the
“policy of attraction” and was balanced with the more
familiar “policy of chastisement” to form the basis of
the operational concept underlying America’s first significant experience with an indigenous guerrilla and a
recalcitrant population in an overseas military intervention. During the Vietnam War, the component of
the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development
Support (CORDS) program known as “constructive
activities” would be recognizable today as reconstruction. Peace enforcement, peace building, stabilization,
pacification, and other types of operations whose purpose goes beyond just the defeat of an enemy army
all involve reconstruction in one form or another. The
new Army doctrine on operations includes discussion of “operational themes,” one of which, peacetime
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military engagement, includes several types of operations that might include reconstruction as an integral
component. But in no form of warfare has reconstruction been more important than in COIN. If successfully
employed and accurately focused, reconstruction can
take away an insurgent’s cause and deny him what he
seeks most fervently—the active and willing support
of the population.
The recent publication of the latest U.S. Army
doctrine on operations—Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations; FM 3-07, Stability Operations; and FM 3-24
Counterinsurgency (and its counterpart in Joint Doctrine (JP) 3-24, Counterinsurgency)—has solidified the
importance of reconstruction to COIN. It is now seen
as an integral part of this important form of warfare—
an activity that when properly undertaken can win
battles and wars, a determining factor on par with any
of the elements of combat power or battlefield operating systems. Publication of these manuals is actually a
case of Army doctrine catching up to the realties of a
contemporary battlefield. For many years, small unit
leaders have been practicing various reconstruction
methods in both Operations ENDURING FREEDOM
and IRAQI FREEDOM. However, success in achieving the desired effect on the fight has been uneven,
and these attempts often have been frustrating efforts
for these leaders. Too many times, reconstruction has
proven an unwieldy, insufficient, or, in worse cases, a
counterproductive effort, and it has been the subject
of a fair amount of scrutiny and criticism at the tactical, operational and policy levels.
This monograph proposes to answer the following
key questions about the role of reconstruction in counterinsurgency operations:
1. How has the role of reconstruction in U.S. COIN
operations developed over the years?
6

2. How should the U.S. Army try to understand
the role of reconstruction in COIN as we have come to
know it in the 21st century?
3. Where does the Army fit into the larger reconstruction effort undertaken by other U.S. Government
departments and agencies in modern COIN operations? Of the universe of key tasks associated with reconstruction in COIN, which should fall to the Army?
4. Does the Army have the necessary capabilities
to accomplish the reconstruction tasks that it will be
expected to accomplish in COIN?
5. What changes or refinements to U.S. Army doctrine, procedures, and organizations will make the
Army a more effective partner in a reconstruction effort on a COIN battlefield?
Because of the many and varied demands for expertise and resources, reconstruction in COIN will of
necessity be a multiagency and often international undertaking. It is impossible to adequately treat the role
of reconstruction in COIN without at least addressing
the issue of interagency cooperation, coordination,
and roles and responsibilities. Chapter 4 is an attempt
to address this matter without venturing into the welltrodden ground that has become the terrain of countless bureaucratic battles over who can or should be
bearing what part of the burden of reconstruction. The
bulk of this monograph will focus on the reconstruction challenges that the Army will most likely face
during COIN—those tasks that should rightly fall to
the Army as well as the ones that the Army will likely
take on because they are critical to mission success but
currently beyond the capability of civilian agencies to
handle in a timely and effective manner.
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Recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have
left many to doubt the worth of reconstruction, especially given the expense involved. To date, about $60
billion has been spent in Iraq and already about twothirds of that amount in Afghanistan even though, at
the time of this writing, the United States has yet to
fully ramp up its efforts there.4 Adding to this doubt
is the concern that the military has assumed numerous responsibilities of civilian agencies when the latter have been unable to live up to expectations (these
concerns were at times spurred on by complaints from
the military itself), which entail the commitment of
combat forces, resources and focus that would otherwise be dedicated to more traditional military tasks.
In this monograph, we treat reconstruction in
COIN for what it currently is: a specific set of activities that have the intended effect of contributing to
the achievement of critical objectives—securing the
population and winning their support away from the
insurgent; strengthening and extending the reach of
legitimate foreign governments into areas where insurgent influence threatens; bolstering moderates and
isolating extremists; and, perhaps most fundamentally, addressing the important sources of violence
and conflict that have given the insurgent his primary
cause. This being a fairly generally acceptable description of the role that reconstruction can play in COIN,
looking for ways to get it right seems a worthwhile
endeavor, especially in light of the publication of new
doctrine and the recent experience gained by ground
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, too much of it through
trial and error.
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1
1. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR)
Quarterly Report, January, 2007. Statistics cited are from the summary entitled “Highlights,” available from www.sigir.mil/reports/
quarterlyreports/Jan07/pdf/Highlights_-_January_2007.pdf.
2. Ibid., p. 4.
3. Ibid., p. 3.
4. Ibid., According to the statistics cited on the home page, the
U.S. Congress has appropriated $39 million of reconstruction to
date.
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CHAPTER 2
RECONSTRUCTION IN TIMES OF WAR:
A HISTORY
Throughout most of the history of warfare, the
complete destruction of an enemy nation and army
was often thought to be the best way to win a war
and secure the peace. Reconstruction efforts as they
are understood today are a natural outgrowth of an
evolution in thinking about war and changed views
about how best to gain stability, enhance national
security, and build a peaceful order. The term has
come to describe two very different concepts. The first
is associated with actions that are undertaken at the
end of hostilities, usually by the victor. More recently,
reconstruction has been viewed as an integral part of
certain types of military operations, to be executed
during the course of hostilities usually as part of a
larger military strategy. A brief, opening discussion of
the history of reconstruction can shed light on some
important understandings—and misunderstandings.
The Marshall Plan.
Reconstruction was a topic of conversation between the leaders of the Allied Powers—Roosevelt,
Churchill, and Stalin—as they conducted their major
summit meetings during the course of the war. Naturally the primary focus was the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers, and the military means
to achieve it. But even as the war raged, and before
the landings at Normandy, the U.S. War Department
had begun planning for the occupation of Germany.
In 1943 Major General John H. Hildring became the
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first director of the new Civil Affairs division, charged
by General Marshall with “planning the nonmilitary
aspects of whatever occupations the Army would
have to handle in the future.”1 There was considerable
disagreement between key officials in the U.S. Government as to the underlying philosophy of the reconstruction of Europe, most of it being centered on the
nature of the coming occupation of Germany. Leading
War Department officials, remembering the results of
the severe treatment of Germany after World War I
and believing that harsh treatment set the conditions
for the rise of Hitler and authoritarian rule in that and
other European nations, were advocates for a restoration of civilian government and the revitalization of
the German economy. An opposing view, famously
championed by Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, held that Germany had not been punished
enough after World War I, and more severe measures
should be implemented to “prevent Germany from
starting World War III.”2 The two camps vied with
each other, initially for Roosevelt’s favor and then for
that of Truman when he became President. But even
by the time of the Potsdam Conference, the direction
that reconstruction of Germany would take was unclear.3
It was only once the reconstruction started that the
way ahead was clarified. Initially, the approach advocated by the Morgenthau camp seemed to be holding
sway—the national institutions of the Nazi government were dismantled, Germany was divided into
zones to be occupied by the victorious parties, and
economic rebuilding was based upon the assumption
that Germany’s economy would be agrarian-based to
ensure that the means to build another war machine
would be denied. But as the occupation wore on and
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the suffering of the European populations became increasingly evident (none more so than in Germany)
while the threat of Soviet expansionism loomed, the
guiding philosophy of reconstruction changed. In
1947, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Order 1779 was drafted which decreed that “an orderly and prosperous
Europe requires the economic contributions of a stable
and productive Germany.”4 The restrictions placed on
production from German heavy industry were partly
rescinded, and allowable steel production levels were
increased significantly.5 The provisions of the Marshall Plan, and the massive infusion of U.S. funds to
support it, continued to hold sway until 1951 when
the burdens of the Korean War running concurrently
with expenditures dedicated to the reconstruction of
Europe became too much for the American public to
bear. Yet the overall effects of the Marshall Plan on
the course of post-World War II history in Europe and
beyond are well known. It was the single most important factor in the birth of a multinational economy that
is one of the most vibrant in the world today. And it
helped to usher in the political and economic consolidation and interdependence that have led to an unprecedented period of peace in a region of the world
where most of the major battlegrounds of the most
devastating wars in history are located.
Reconstruction in “Small Wars”—The U.S.
Experience in the Philippines.
The American intervention in the Philippine Islands at the beginning of the 20th century does not
figure particularly large in military history. Though it
was truly a small war by many of the standards accepted by those who assign such classifications, the
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response of the U.S. Government and military to the
insurrection that grew in the wake of Commodore
George Dewey’s victory over the Spanish fleet in
Manila Bay in the spring of 1898 is significant well beyond the number of soldiers deployed or the attention
it is paid by most military scholars.6 Soldiers in the
ranks of Army formations that were sent to fight with
the Spanish occupiers, led by an officer corps whose
most significant combat experience was gained in the
U.S. Civil War, were about to become the first American counterinsurgent force in history.
Judging by the first contacts, the war seemed to
be anything but unconventional. There were about
8,000 American Soldiers in Manila when the U.S. flag
was raised over the city in August 1898 after a quick
victory over Spanish forces there. By February, it
had become clear that the Philippine rebels who had
been battling the Spanish occupiers for many years
prior to the U.S. intervention had a very different
view of the future of their country than that of their
American “liberators.” On February 4, tensions that
had been growing between U.S. forces inside the city
and the Army of Liberation of the famous Philippine
rebel leader Ernesto Aguinaldo erupted into full scale
combat. Vastly outnumbering their opponents, Aguinaldo’s forces had arrayed themselves in a loose ring
completely surrounding the city. U.S. Major General
Elwell S. Otis seized upon an opportunity to surprise
his adversary by striking in mass first, ordering a frontal assault on the Liberation Army’s defensive perimeter launched from outside Manila, and a simultaneous
operation conducted by three regiments to secure the
city itself. Both operations were supported by naval
barrages and field artillery fire. Over the next week,
the ensuing encounters, known collectively as the
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Battle of Manila, consisted of repeated instances of
U.S. forces offering conventional engagements and
Agunaldo’s Liberation Army accepting on exactly
those terms. The resulting American victory in the
field was completely predictable.7
But in Manila soon thereafter, a pattern started to
emerge that in one form or another would challenge
U.S. forces in the Philippines for the next half century.
In response to the decisive defeats that his forces had
suffered, Aguinaldo issued the order for all military
aged men to join “the militia” while putting into place
a guerrilla organization that would continue the fight
against the American occupiers for years to come.8
The ensuing guerrilla attacks were not long in coming. Four days after the end of the Battle of Manila, a
captured document revealed to the U.S. commanders
that the city’s militias had been ordered to “rise and
wage war without quarter” in the streets.9 Meanwhile,
in the neighboring Visayas Islands, a rural-based
guerrilla movement in the “boondocks” was growing.
The history of the ensuing insurgency that was carried
out by this loose coalition is well-documented and has
become known for its ferocity. It is well-known and
understandable that the guerrilla fighters resorted
to violent asymmetric methods. Also well known is
that the response from U.S. forces, led first by Major
General Otis and then famously by Major General
Arthur McArthur, was severe. In fact, it is the tactics of the “howling wilderness,” the introduction of
water boarding as an interrogation technique, concentration camps, and the accepted (if not encouraged) technique of “civilizing ‘em with the Krag” that
are the most oft-recalled symbols of America’s first
encounter with COIN in the Philippines.10
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Less well remembered is the experience of America’s counterinsurgent army in Negros. A veteran of
the Battle of Manila, Brigadier General James F. Smith
was appointed the military governor of the SubDistrict
of Negros on March 1, 1899. Garrisoned by only 400
troopers of the 1st California Infantry of that state’s
Volunteers, this smaller island of 320,000 inhabitants
was rife with factional fighting and instability that
was mainly the result of a combination of political
rivalries between nationalist movements, attacks by
guerrilla fighters, and criminal activity. Upon his arrival in Negros, Smith set out to establish on the island
a showcase for American rule in the provinces.11 He
used American troops mostly to secure the population
and key political and economic centers and rarely to
conduct offensive operations. One of his first acts was
to establish a 200-man local constabulary to take the
lead in policing of the major towns. A local government was established, and measures taken to restore
economic and commercial stability to the island. Smith
fully embraced the notion of “benevolent assimilation”; his proud claim was that “all towns occupied
by our troops and all the places where they have had
an opportunity of fraternizing with the people have
remained our steadfast friends.” As military governor, he also dedicated considerable effort to what has
become known as “capacity building” in local governments, the first objectives being eliminating corruption, trimming bloated bureaucracies, and a fair and
effective system of taxation.12
In later years of the Philippine War, approaches
like this one in Negros became the exception rather
than the rule. Convinced that the insurgency had been
beaten and that the effects of benevolent assimilation were winning over the population, General Otis
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requested relief from his duties claiming that “we no
longer deal with organized insurrection.”13 In May
1900 General Arthur MacArthur took command in the
Philippines and came to very different conclusions
about the state of the insurgency and how to deal with
it. Whether the increased violence and renewed insurgency that followed his assumption of command
and continued until Aguinaldo’s surrender in 1901
warranted the abandonment of much of the U.S. civic
action campaign and the choice to resume large scale
conventional operations or was a result of those decisions is open to question.14 What is certain is that
America had experienced its first COIN, and had at
least learned that small wars could be as complex and
challenging as large ones, and an approach to them
deserved some serious thought.
A Brief History of the Writings about COIN and the
Role of Reconstruction.
Early theorists of small wars paid scant attention to
the topic of reconstruction. T. E. Lawrence was one of
the few participants in early insurgencies who put his
thinking on such warfare in writing. In recounting his
participation in the Arab insurgency against the Ottoman Empire, he listed 27 articles that summarized
what he had learned of insurgency while fighting
with the Arabs during World War I. The list includes
very detailed and personal advice about the nuances
of fighting with Arab irregular forces, the most wellknown being his caution, “Do not try to do too much
with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably
than that you do it perfectly.”15 It is interesting to note
that this particular article has been cited often by current students and practitioners of COIN operations to
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support such notions as “putting an Iraqi (or Afghani)
face” on reconstruction efforts. When taken in context, however, Lawrence was clearly providing advice
about who should do most of the leading and fighting
in battle. In fact, none of the 27 articles pays much attention at all to measures taken with the population in
mind, much less reconstruction.16
It took another 50 years and the outbreak of the
wars of national liberation that brought the decolonization of the Third World before a focus on the population as critical to insurgency and COIN, and the
specific role of reconstruction, was introduced to the
body of writings on COIN. The French military theorist David Galula has regularly been cited in current
works on COIN with a frequency that surpasses the
notice he received when he was writing in the 1960s.
Drawing on experience gained in Algeria and writing
for the RAND Corporation from his adopted home
in the United States, Galula sought to present what
he posited were the “rules of counterinsurgency warfare.”17
In his foreword to Galula’s text, one of today’s
preeminent experts on counterinsurgency, John Nagl,
highlights the contribution that Galula made to military writings as being “his lucid instructions on how
counterinsurgency forces can protect and hence gain
the support of the populace, acquire information on
the identity and location of insurgents, and thereby
defeat the insurgency.”18 But Galula also emphasizes
the utility to the counterinsurgent force of providing
for the population beyond just security, touching on
the value of providing for the needs and desires of the
population—both the short-term ones (which he describes as providing “incentives”) and those that are
more enduring (effecting “reforms”).
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He describes these incentives and reforms as being designed to win “the wholehearted support of the
population,”19 and he recommends that they should
begin as soon as practicable. Galula advises that “the
counterinsurgent can at once start working on various
projects in the economic, social, cultural, and medical
fields, where results are not entirely dependent on the
active cooperation from the population”20 and specifically mentions easily organized activities, such as
“cleaning the village or repairing the streets.”21
But Galula makes a distinction between incentives
that are offered to win the support of the population
in the near term and the more enduring reform that
is required to remove the causes of the insurgency.
He uses Mao’s formulation, the “unsolved contradiction,” to characterize the causes, and observes that
they may manifest themselves as one or more types
of “problems”— social, political, racial, or economic.22
He postulates that, “To deprive the insurgent of a
good cause amounts to solving the country’s basic
problems.”23 But he is realistic about when such fundamental reform should be attempted, observing that
attempts to effect reform in an unstable or unsecure
environment will probably be ineffective, and maybe
even counterproductive.
Finally, Galula offers observations about roles and
missions in COIN, positing that “it is better to entrust
civilian tasks to civilians,” but also noting that, because the civilian bureaucracy is never up to “the personnel requirements of a counterinsurgency,” that “to
confine soldiers to purely military functions while urgent and vital tasks have to be done, and nobody else
is available to undertake them, would be senseless.”
However, he warns against carrying this approach too
far in duration or scope saying, “. . . to let the mili-
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tary direct the entire process . . . is so dangerous that it
must be resisted at all costs.”24
Reconstruction and the Vietnam War.
Galula died in 1967 when concerns were growing
about the course of the war in Vietnam. Contrary to the
earlier projections of General William Westmoreland,
who had predicted victory by that year, it became increasingly clear that U.S. forces would need to play
more than just a secondary role in the fighting going
forward, which was becoming more than the Army
of the Republic of Vietnam could handle. U.S. troop
levels began to increase dramatically, and national
leaders at the highest levels were looking for ways to
stabilize the deteriorating situation in Vietnam.
Controlling the population became a matter of
concern. The “strategic hamlets program” which had
been initiated earlier in the 1960s was proving to be
a failure. Similar to the program that had been carried out by the British in Malaya, the effort involved
resettling rural populations from their small villages
to nominally secure locations where the population
could be isolated from the Viet Cong and more easily controlled. The program brought limited results
because it was never properly resourced and proved
wildly unpopular with the Vietnamese people who
resented being uprooted. Strategic hamlets were rapidly infiltrated by insurgents who in many cases were
welcomed by disgruntled inhabitants, and by 1963 the
program was essentially dead.25
As troop levels increased, policymakers in Washington searched for programs that, in accordance
with informed thinking on COIN warfare such as that
found in the writings of Galula, could be effectively
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implemented to make inroads with the population,
the sea in which the Viet Cong seemed to be swimming freely.
Enter Robert William Komer. Originally a staffer
working directly for McGeorge Bundy in President
Lyndon Johnson’s National Security Council (NSC),
Komer rose to prominence in Washington circles
when he served temporarily as the National Security
Advisor after Bundy’s departure. While serving on
the NSC, Komer focused primarily on how to coordinate and strengthen the effort of the civilian agencies in Washington in support of the growing military
effort in Vietnam. He quickly became convinced that
the solution to this coordination challenge could not
be found in Washington but would have to be driven
from inside the theater of war itself. In early 1967 he
set to work on developing the mechanism to achieve
this end, and left shortly thereafter to operationalize
the concept in Vietnam himself.26
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV)
Directive Number 10-12 was the order issued by General
Westmoreland’s headquarters that put into effect the
organization and authorities that Komer felt were necessary to bring about pacification—the necessary condition for successful counterinsurgency in Vietnam.
The stated purpose of MACV Directive 10-12 was “To
provide for the integration of Civil Operations and
Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) activities within MACV.”27
Though the acronym CORDS soon took on a life of
its own, the original directive described an organization and assigned responsibilities that were designed
to bring order to the civilian effort in Vietnam, which
to that point had been relatively disorganized. Now
commonly thought of as an integrated program in and
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of itself, the distinguishing characteristics of CORDS
can be described as follows:
• The principle objective was rural “pacification,”
bringing security and stability to the countryside in order to deprive the Viet Cong of the
support of the people.
• CORDS actually consisted of a series of programs, some of which were focused on reconstruction goals (for example, the “Takeoff Program,” described below). Others focused on the
security of the population (such as the founding of the paramilitary Regional and Popular
Forces), and also included efforts to undermine
and attack the Viet Cong military and political
infrastructure (the Chieu Hoi and Phoenix programs).
• The reconstruction effort was regionally focused, and viewed as critical to the overall success
of CORDS. Komer saw reconstruction (which
he called the “constructive side” of CORDS) as
“a series of interlocking programs . . . designed
to generate both positive rural support of the
GVN [Government of Vietnam] and antipathy
towards the VC [Vietnamese Communists].”28
So, inter alia, there was a carrot and stick effect
desired: The idea was to win the loyalties of the
local people away from the insurgents by offering them benefits and advantages that the Viet
Cong could not, while gaining leverage through
these efforts—that is, making the continuation
of assistance conditional upon the continued
cooperation of the population.29
• The organization that was created to implement
CORDS was based on a fully integrated military and civilian architecture. The organization-
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al diagram that was appended to MACV 10-12
depicted military and civilian officials working
with and for each other at every level. The
clearest signal of General Westmoreland’s intention to make CORDS a civil-military operation was the position that he created for Komer
himself—he served as one of two deputy force
commanders with at least nominal command
authority and the responsibility to give guidance and direction to military and civilian officials alike who were located lower in the chain.
The development and constructive side of CORDS
was also notable for several characteristics which are
of special interest to those familiar with reconstruction and its role in COIN today:
• Like the program overall, the reconstruction
component was intended to be a civil-military
effort. Teams composed of military officers and
soldiers worked with Department of State and
U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) officials at the ground level, interfacing with Vietnamese district and village leaders on various development projects. Further,
Komer felt strongly that the attempt made by
some CORDS officials to divide up tasks between military and civilian activities in accordance with some strict formulation of their respective lanes would lead to “a whole series of
mistakes.”30
• Activities and programs that made up the reconstruction effort of CORDS were designed
to meet the full range of reconstruction objectives—economic, infrastructure, governance,
rule of law, and public information. These pro-
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grams were primarily of two types. The first
were those efforts that were focused on the
longer-term changes and reforms that were
needed to remove the sources of unrest and violence that made the insurgency possible in the
first place—the types of actions that Galula saw
as essential to remove the insurgent’s cause. So,
for example the Takeoff Program which was a
key component of CORDS included as one of
its eight platforms the achievement of Republic
of Vietnam (RVN) policies and instrumentalities to carry out effective land reform. Another
Takeoff project was to be the revitalization and
repair of key road networks.31 The second type
of programs were those with more near-term,
local, highly visible impacts that could win
the hearts and minds of the local populace. An
example program of this nature was the “Assistance in Kind” program which was notable
for its smaller projects and emergency relief in
villages across Vietnam. The Assistance in Kind
program included provisions to give CORDS
advisors “pocket money” that they could spend
immediately on projects as they saw fit.32
• Though reconstruction and development were
presumed to be most effectively and efficiently
carried out in a secure environment, there was
the realization that it would often be desirable, if not necessary, to begin building before
an area was fully pacified. In a precursor to
modern COIN doctrine, Komer’s taxonomy of
reconstruction activities included the formulation “clear, hold,” but notably left out the third
element of the modern day triad, “build.” In
Komer’s discussion of CORDS, building was
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treated as an integral part of the “hold” activities that at times might also need to be carried
out during the “clear” phase.33
• There were great pains taken to ensure that
reconstruction activities were viewed as being
led by legitimate officials of the Vietnamese
government. The “RD” in CORDS, standing for
“revolutionary development,” may have struck
Western observers as sounding somewhat
unusual, but to the Vietnamese that choice of
terminology was familiar and significant. On
various occasions, Komer emphasized the point
that the entire pacification effort was to be “a
100% Vietnamese show.”34
In the end, CORDS was implemented with the goal
of pacifying 10,000 hamlets and 2,000 villages in 250
districts and 44 provinces. At the program’s height,
the U.S. cadre consisted of 5,500 U.S. advisors working
with a budget of $1.3 billion.35 However, evaluating
the overall effectiveness of the program is problematic. The measures of effectiveness used by officials
of CORDS—embodied in the Hamlet Evaluation System—were hotly debated at the time and remain so to
this day. What can be said, however, is that the general pacification effort in Vietnam—and CORDS specifically—fundamentally influenced the way strategists,
theorists, and practitioners would think about COIN.
As Robert Komer himself would say, “We didn’t invent pacification, but we did put it on the map at long
last on a major scale as an indispensable part of counterinsurgency strategy.”36
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The Legacy of Vietnam and “Nation Building.”
The general aversion to the U.S. use of military
force attributable to the outcome of the war in Vietnam
has been well-documented and much discussed. The
impact that Vietnam had on the thinking of some of the
most influential policymakers of the 1980s and 1990s
effectively constrained every president after Nixon
at critical moments, especially when they wanted to
keep the use of force on the table. Formal and informal
guidelines like the Weinberger Doctrine (articulated
in many places, but first by the Secretary of Defense
in a speech to the national Press Club in 1984),37 and
General Colin Powell’s oft-repeated thoughts on the
use of military force, best articulated in an article he
wrote for Foreign Affairs that appeared in the Winter
1992/93 edition, are examples of this effect. In general, these and similar prescriptions made a strong case
that the use of military force should not be considered
unless vital U.S. national security interests were at
stake; other feasible options (political, diplomatic, or
economic) had been exhausted; it could be presumed
that the use of force was likely to be quick and overwhelming; and that the anticipated aftermath would
involve no drawn out commitment of U.S. forces.
Yet the last quarter of the 20th century is notable
not for the absence of occasions when the United States
deployed forces to overseas contingencies, but for the
numerous times that American soldiers were called on
to undertake “small wars” of the type that took them
far away from home and from the practiced core competencies in major combat operations that they had
developed during the Cold War. Grenada, Panama,
Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo are only the most
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well known examples that can be cited. There were
also numerous operations where the presence of U.S.
forces was less commonly known or openly acknowledged. Army units, especially the Special Forces, conducted operations as part of a program known at the
time as internal defense and development (IDAD).
IDAD involved the employment of U.S. forces to support a host nation’s efforts to identify the root causes
of unrest and violence to take away the cause of an insurgent group, ideally before a full blown insurgency
could take root. One of the most successful examples
of the effectiveness of IDAD is the case of U.S. 1980s
operations conducted in El Salvador.38
But in the eyes of the American people and reflected
in the military and political policy positions that their
leaders took, the very real casualties of the Vietnam
War were those activities whose purpose had even a
slight scent of attempts to “win hearts and minds” or
activities that smacked of “nation building.” Especially egregious in the eyes of politicians, military leaders, and, to a large degree, the general public alike,
were those activities that might threaten to entangle
the military in some sort of “quagmire” of political or
developmental issues, matters that drew soldiers into
activities that were outside of warfighting, or efforts
to effect improvements that could be seen as the responsibility of the government or the people of the nation that our forces had invaded. What is now known
as reconstruction fell well outside the boundaries of
any comfort zone so delineated.
It is true that there was some appetite for nation
building under the type of very strictly limited, almost
sui generis, conditions that existed in the aftermath of
the war to liberate Kuwait in 1990-91. The rebuilding
of Kuwait was perhaps the most successful recon-
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struction effort undertaken since the Marshall Plan.39
Kuwait Task Force teams were set up to conduct the
full range of reconstruction activities—public security
and safety, human services, infrastructure, public services, and commerce.40 But there was no fighting to
speak of while the reconstruction went on; certainly
there was no insurgency to contend with. In terms of
development, Kuwait started the war as one of the
most advanced nations in the Middle East, and much
of the infrastructure that had existed before the war,
though heavily damaged, could be repaired or refurbished as opposed to requiring replacement. Private
firms and companies willing to do the work in Kuwait were plentiful. Outside of the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers and some Civil Affairs units, very few
soldiers were involved in the post-war mission. The
Kuwaitis proved willing and able hosts, and had access to sufficient funding so that sharing the burdens
of reconstruction never became an issue in the United
States. Perhaps most importantly, the bulk of the reconstruction effort was over within less than a year
after the end of hostilities in Kuwait and Iraq.
The example of operations in Haiti is far more illustrative—and typical—of the post-Vietnam attitude
of military and civilian officials to reconstruction as a
supporting effort to military operations, or as a longerterm effort to address the root sources of instability
undertaken by a civil-military team. On September 18,
1994, after repeated unheeded warnings to the leadership of Haiti’s junta to yield governance of that nation
to the democratically elected president, Secretary of
Defense Perry signed an executive order launching a
forced entry operation which was intended to end the
military dictatorship. In the event, no forced entry was
required (a last minute deal led to the departure of the
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junta); nonetheless, U.S. forces were still deployed to
Haiti into what was classified as a “less-than-permissive threat environment.”41 Based on these conditions,
and following several violent incidents involving U.S.
Soldiers that called for the use of deadly force, the
commander of U.S. forces, Lieutenant General Hugh
Shelton, announced that force protection would be his
top priority. The small number of nascent reconstruction activities that were ongoing virtually died. The
occupying forces were to engage in no activities that
could be construed as nation-building. For a time the
vast majority of regular U.S. Army Soldiers who had
deployed to Haiti were even instructed not to leave
their bases. U.S. military forces were not involved in
policing or in the training of police. Based on their assertion that restoring electricity and providing drinking water to the population of Port-au-Prince was a
civilian task, the military command in Haiti had to be
ordered by higher headquarters to undertake the mission when it became clear that civilian agencies would
be delayed in their arrival.42 The perceived inability
or unwillingness of U.S. forces to attend to the basic
needs of the Haitian people led to a deterioration of
support from the local population that may well have
had a severe negative impact had the occupation
lasted more than the few months that it did. Though
many analysts have judged operations in Haiti a military success, it was clear then—and perhaps clearer
today—that the failure to address any of the more fundamental problems existing in Haiti at that time has
contributed to a level of instability that continues to
plague that small island nation to this day.
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The Impact of September 11, 2001.
Many of the nagging concerns about small wars
and the role that nation building-like activities could
play in them have been put aside, at least temporarily,
in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001
(9/11). There was an almost immediate understanding that the United States was entering a period when
addressing instability in troubled parts of the world
could be construed as being critical to national security interests, especially when that instability might give
rise to or provide safe harbor for extremist fighters
advocating radical ideologies. For the most part with
eyes open, senior political decisionmakers launched
efforts on all fronts to craft policies that were intended
to put the nation and all branches of its government
on a path to bring stability to regions deemed critical
to the United States. And military leaders responded
with directives and doctrine to support that approach.
At the center of this policy and doctrine is a firm endorsement of the important role of reconstruction.
The two documents that can best be said to have
captured the essentials of this direction are National
Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) and DoD
Directive 3000.05 (DoDD 3000.05), both of which were
issued in late 2005. NSPD-44 puts it plainly. The
first sentence in the statement of policy reads: “The
United States has a significant stake in enhancing
the capacity to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries or regions, especially those at risk of,
in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife, and to
help them establish a sustainable path toward peaceful societies, democracies, and market economies”43
This clear endorsement of reconstruction is followed
by specific guidance on roles and responsibilities of
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the various departments of the U.S. Government to
support those activities. The Department of State is
given the responsibility to coordinate and lead what
the document calls “stability and reconstruction operations.” The relationship between State and the Department of Defense (DoD) is described as follows:
“The Secretaries of State and Defense will integrate
stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans
with military contingency plans when relevant and
appropriate. The Secretaries of State and Defense will
develop a general framework for fully coordinating
stabilization and reconstruction activities and military
operations at all levels where appropriate.”44
Fully consistent with the guidance in NSPD-44,
DoDD 3000.05 states that, “Stability operations are a
core military mission that the Department of Defense
shall be prepared to conduct and support.”45 The document goes on to list the activities that are considered
to be components of stability operations (establishing
good governance and rule of law, repairing infrastructure, economic revitalization, and other reconstruction activities feature prominently among these), and,
though emphasizing the primarily civilian nature of
these tasks and stipulating the comparative advantage
resident in civilian departments to accomplish them,
it nevertheless states that, “US military forces shall be
prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or
maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”46
This guidance was issued at about the time when
violent attacks in Iraq against coalition forces and the
Iraqi people, carried out by Sunni rejectionists and
Shia radicals, were increasing, and as it was becoming
increasingly clear that operations in Afghanistan were
amounting to something more than just mopping up
the residue of the deposed Taliban dictatorship. U.S.
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decisionmakers, especially within the military, were
becoming increasingly aware that they were engaging in two COIN wars simultaneously, and key political leaders fully expected that the military would
be prepared to at least play a strong supporting role
in bringing about a stable environment in these two
regions, if not take the leading role in both efforts.
Insofar as was possible at the time, the military
establishment initiated several programs designed to
adapt the force to the demands of the political leadership. Reshaping a military that at the start of the 21st
century had remained essentially unchanged since
the victory in Operation DESERT STORM has proved
difficult, and understandably has progressed in fits
and starts. It takes time to modify organizations, restructure training programs, develop leaders, arm and
equip soldiers with the type of kit that is suited to the
special rigors of COINs, and then make the appropriate budget adjustments. Progress has been uneven
across the lines of effort that have been traditionally
used by defense (and especially Army) planners to
define new requirements—the so called DOTML-PF.47
The theory of COIN warfare found in treatises like
those of David Galula, and the lessons learned about
pacification, development, and reconstruction in Vietnam, have been resurrected from relative obscurity
and become the passion of both civilian and military
experts. Perhaps the most notable outcome of this rediscovered interest is the series of doctrinal manuals
that have been recently published that today serve to
guide the current operations of the military, especially
ground forces, despite the fact that transformation to
meet the requirements of the operations described
in these manuals is lagging. The doctrine, which has
become in effect the leading edge of a fundamental
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transformation of U.S. Armed Forces, has much to
say about the role of reconstruction in successful operations designed to defeat insurgencies and establish
stability. Chapter 3 will examine this doctrine in some
detail.
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36

CHAPTER 3
A DOCTRINAL REVIEW
The recent publication of new U.S. Army and
Marine Corps doctrine has been a significant contribution to the Army’s understanding of modern warfare as we are experiencing it now and are likely to
know it for some time to come. The new doctrine in
Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations; FM 3-07, Stability
Operations; and FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, provides
a coherent description of the relationship between different types of operations within the context of how
ground forces will operate as part of joint, combined,
and interagency teams along the full spectrum of conflict. Army doctrine has heavily influenced new Joint
manuals that have followed; for example, Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, Counterinsurgency adopts the concepts
developed by the Army and Marine Corps almost
wholesale. The doctrine has also been carefully written to ensure that Army concepts are aligned with the
latest thinking in the interagency community on civilmilitary operations. This chapter presents an assessment of the treatment of reconstruction in this new
doctrine, and the degree to which the new doctrine
advances an understanding of the role that it plays in
counterinsurgency (COIN).
THE ARMY OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
FM 3-0 discusses the “spectrum of conflict” and
identifies “operational themes” along the spectrum.
Figure 3.1 shows the graphic depiction of that relationship.
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Figure 3.1. The Spectrum of Conflict and
Operational Themes. 1
Later in FM 3-0 the Army’s operational concept is
introduced as “full spectrum operations,” which is described as consisting of three components—offensive,
defensive, and stability operations—when it is executed in what the FM calls “joint campaigns (overseas).”
(As it pertains to homeland security within the United
States, the components become offense, defense, and
civil support.) The operational environment and nature of the type of conflict at hand determines the
specific relationship between the components in any
given operation. (See Figure 3.2.)

38

Figure 3.2. Full Spectrum Operations —
the Army’s Operational Concept.2
FM 3-0 is remarkable for the clarity and simplicity of its explanation of the relationship between the
three components of full spectrum operations, and the
unprecedented importance that is placed on the role
of stability operations. Unlike previous versions of
the Army’s capstone manual on operations, the new
version of FM 3-0 goes into some detail in describing
stability operations, placing them on the same plane
as offensive and defensive operations in terms of their
importance to the Army’s operational concept. Later in
FM 3-0, the five primary stability tasks are introduced:
civil security, civil control, restore essential services,
support to governance, and support to economic and
infrastructure development.
RECONSTRUCTION AND FULL SPECTRUM
OPERATIONS
The first important contribution of the new doctrine to an understanding of reconstruction is the most
basic—a definition. As discussed in Chapter 2, the
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term “reconstruction” as it has been used throughout
the majority of U.S. military history, has been applied
to the post-conflict rebuilding of a vanquished foe.
Additionally, since the beginning of the 20th century
and America’s involvement in small wars, there has
been frequent mention made in doctrine and other
writing on military matters of the important salutary
role that various nonmilitary or “nonkinetic” activities
can play in military operations, especially in irregular
warfare. In these writings, these so-called nonkinetic
activities are frequently referenced and largely understood to fall under the heading “reconstruction,” but
are never specifically classified as such. As a result,
until the publication of FMs 3-0, 3-07, and 3-24, the
use of the term “reconstruction” often engendered
confusion. An example is the understanding of what
provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) are and what
they do in Iraq and Afghanistan. The uninitiated often
think of them as focused on rebuilding things, when
in fact these small, multipurpose interagency teams
have a much broader focus.3
FM 3-07 goes a long way to clearing up the conceptual confusion by providing the first doctrinal definition of reconstruction, found in the glossary of that
manual:
The process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for long-term development.4

There are two significant points to note about this
definition, and one key implication. The first point is
that the FM 3-07 language makes no association between reconstruction and any particular phase of war-
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fare, reinforcing the Army’s conceptualization that it
is not just a post-conflict or post-crisis activity. The
second point is that the definition captures a broad
range of activities, focused on addressing the needs of
a population and building capacity in the institutions
of their society. This places the concept of reconstruction well beyond the notion of simply the physical rebuilding of structures—houses, roads, factories, and
the like. The implication is that the new doctrine places
reconstruction at the center of the Army’s operational
concept, on par with any of the most fundamental activities that contribute to full spectrum operations. A
comparison between the discussion of reconstruction
in FM 3-07 and the description of stability operations
in that document and in FM 3-0 underscores this point:
The component activities listed in the doctrinal definition of reconstruction are exactly the same as three of
the five categories of tasks of stability operations.
FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS, COIN, AND
RECONSTRUCTION
Counterinsurgency is described in FM 3-0 as a
type of operation falling into the category of “irregular warfare,” one of the five operational themes. The
attempt made in FM 3.0 to establish connections between points along the spectrum of conflict (unstable
peace, general war,” etc.) and operational themes (e.g.,
irregular war, peace operations, and major combat
operations) engenders some conceptual confusion for
those who are thinking about COIN and the role that
reconstruction plays in it. For example, it is certainly
possible to envision COIN as playing a major role in a
peace enforcement operation (a different operational
theme) being carried out in an environment described
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as “unstable peace” on the spectrum of conflict. Nonetheless, it still follows that, like other full spectrum
operations, the conduct of COIN will always involve
different mixes of offense, defense, and stability tasks
depending on the mission and the nature of the operational environment.
COIN is described only briefly in either FM 3-0
or FM 3-07, most likely in deference to the treatment
it gets in the much lauded FM 3-24, a manual which
perhaps more than any other in the history of Army
doctrine has virtually taken on a life of its own. Something between doctrine and a philosophy of war, FM
3-24 has much to say about the elements of reconstruction, while barely using the term itself at all—not even
once in the doctrinal sense introduced in FM 3-07.
The rationale for conducting reconstruction in
COIN is stated repeatedly, but its essence boils down
to three reasons: First, because it is the right thing to
do. Paragraph 2-41 notes that “Human decency and
the laws of war require land forces to assist the populace in their AO’s [areas of operation]. . . . to address
human needs.” The second reason cited is that reconstruction persuades the population to support the
counterinsurgent and reject the guerilla:
COIN is fought among the populace. Counterinsurgents take upon themselves responsibility for the people’s well-being in all its manifestations. These include
the following:
• Security from insurgent intimidation and coercion, as well as from nonpolitical violence and
crime.
• Provision for basic economic needs.
• Provision of essential services, such as water,
electricity, sanitation, and medical care.
• Sustainment of key social and cultural institutions.
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• O
 ther aspects that contribute to a society’s basic
quality of life.5

The third reason or purpose offered is that, as it
is defined in FM 3-07, reconstruction can address the
fundamental sources of violence and unrest in the nation, thereby removing the insurgent’s cause:
While security is essential to setting the stage for
overall progress, lasting victory comes from a vibrant
economy, political participation, and restored hope.
. . . Soldiers and Marines should prepare to execute
many nonmilitary missions to support COIN efforts.
Everyone has a role in nation building, not just Department of State and civil affairs personnel.6

Elsewhere in FM 3-24, there is discussion of the
nature of the role that the specific elements of reconstruction play in the overall COIN effort. As to be expected, the COIN “lines of operations” track closely
with the elements of full spectrum operations, and
the lines associated with reconstruction are a virtual
one for one match (essential services, governance, and
economic development in FM 3-24 and “restore essential services,” “support to governance,” and “support
to economic and infrastructure development” in FM
3-0). But perhaps the most memorable endorsement
for the importance of reconstruction in COIN comes
in the section of FM 3-24 entitled “Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency” where the authors note: “Some of the
best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot.”7
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WHERE THE DOCTRINE IS STRONG.
The strength of the Army’s doctrine as it is presented in FMs 3-0, 3-07, and 3-24 is in the clear description of a new operational environment and the
comprehensive view conveyed of how the Army will
operate within that environment. All three of these
works have risen to the level of “capstone manuals”
and, as such, serve the purposes to which such doctrine has been traditionally intended. As has been the
case in the past, most of the “how to” discussions are
left for other venues—supporting doctrine, schools,
and unit training being the most important of these.
As regards reconstruction, the salient points that
emerge from the description of reconstruction in the
new doctrine are:
1. As a collection of activities now grouped under
a doctrinal heading, reconstruction plays a vital role
in Army operations and must be synchronized with
other military actions to achieve the commander’s
overall COIN objectives. Specifically, skillfully conducted reconstruction can be an important part of
operations conducted in an environment of “stable
peace” (for example, as an integral part of a security
assistance program) as well as a supporting effort
to counterinsurgency operations conducted during
periods of limited intervention or irregular warfare,
where reconstruction activities can be designed to defeat an insurgent by winning over a population that
might other wise be indifferent—or even hostile—to
the cause of the counterinsurgent, thereby isolating
the insurgent from what he needs most: the support
of the populace. That is, a critical purpose of reconstruction in COIN is “to win the hearts and minds” of
the people.
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2. Reconstruction is also the most direct approach
to the root causes of an insurgency or the instability
that spawns it. Successful reconstruction can remove
the basic causes that the insurgent espouses, thereby
marginalizing him, and can add to the legitimacy and
support of the local and national instruments of the
government, thereby furthering progress towards the
counterinsurgent’s campaign objectives. To that end,
strengthening national institutions and building capacity in legitimate government—sometimes called
“nation building”—is a second legitimate purpose of
reconstruction in COIN.
3. A secure environment supports effective reconstruction, but reconstruction must also be thought of
as a sort of combat multiplier that is used by counterinsurgent forces to establish security. This means that
reconstruction will often take place as part of combat
operations.
4. To defeat the insurgency, the counterinsurgent
must reach the point where combat and security operations are the supporting effort; reconstruction to address the fundamental sources of conflict underlying
the insurgency is the supported effort. But en route to
that point, at times reconstruction must be undertaken
as a supporting effort to combat operations, necessitating what has been called “reconstruction under fire.”8
5. It follows, then, that reconstruction activities,
projects, and programs need to be planned with two
effects in mind—the impact on longer term objectives
that are related to the causes of the insurgency, and
the more immediate impact that can be had through
reconstruction in support of combat and security operations in the near term. Decisions about reconstruction activities made by tactical commanders designed
to achieve near-term effects on the populace must be
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informed by an understanding of the implications for
reconstruction efforts that are designed to achieve the
longer term effect of eliminating the sources of violence and instability, and vice versa.
LOOMING ISSUES FOR THE PRACTITIONER
As it treats reconstruction, the new doctrine reveals
some issues that have made it difficult for those who
must deal in the world of the how to— how they must
execute and prepare themselves and their formations
to implement reconstruction if they are to achieve success in COIN.
The first issue has to do with the sheer number of
tasks that reconstruction in COIN involves. Reconstruction tasks that are specified in the doctrine more
than double the total number of tasks that tactical
units must be prepared to perform in order to conduct
stability operations. (It is worthy of note that, according to the new FM 3-0, tasks associated with stability
and civil security operations outnumber those that are
associated with offensive and defensive operations.)
The second issue that the new doctrine raises is the
complexity of the tasks that collectively comprise reconstruction in COIN. Implied in the manuals is the
notion that tactical units which are undertaking COIN
operations must be prepared to execute a wide range
of reconstruction tasks, varying in levels of sophistication and degree of required expertise from organizing
and conducting trash collection to establishing work
programs to support agricultural development in the
host nation, or supporting public sector investment
programs. This range of reconstruction tasks raises serious questions about the ability to ready any tactical
unit—in terms of manning, training, organizing and
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equipping—to undertake certain of the reconstruction
tasks that are called for by the latest doctrine.
Third, the matter of who has primary responsibility
for different reconstruction tasks—and what exactly
that should signify to military commanders preparing
for COIN—is discussed extensively in FMs 3-07 and
3-24. In FM 3-07, reconstruction tasks are classified as
one of three types:
1. Tasks for which military forces retain primary
responsibility.
2. Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations likely retain responsibility, but military forces
are prepared to execute.
3. Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain primary responsibility.9
FM 3-24 sends the same message about responsibilities for reconstruction tasks, stating in Chapter 1:
The purpose of America’s ground forces is to fight and
win the Nation’s wars. Throughout history, however,
the Army and Marine Corps have been called on to
perform many tasks beyond pure combat; this has
been particularly true during the conduct of COIN
operations. COIN requires Soldiers and Marines to be
ready both to fight and to build—depending on the
security situation and a variety of other factors.10

and later in Chapter 2:
Political, social, and economic programs are most
commonly and appropriately associated with civilian
organizations and expertise; however, effective implementation of these programs is more important than
who performs the tasks. If adequate civilian capacity
is not available, military forces fill the gap. COIN programs for political, social, and economic well-being
are essential to developing the local capacity that commands popular support when accurately perceived.11
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The most revealing indication of what will be in
store for military commanders by way of reconstruction in COIN is the conclusion about responsibilities
drawn from FM 3-24 which sums up the preferred division of labor as: “Whenever possible, civilian agencies or individuals with the greatest applicable expertise should perform a task,” but follows this statement
closely with a discussion of the “realistic division of
labor.” This notion is introduced with an admonition:
“The preferred or ideal division of labor is frequently
unattainable,” and includes advice to commanders
to prepare to accomplish critical reconstruction tasks
themselves. This mission to be prepared to take on
so-called “civilian tasks” is accompanied by a quote
attributed to David Galula, “The soldier must then be
prepared to become . . . a social worker, a civil engineer, a schoolteacher, a nurse, a boy scout.”12
The discussion in the manuals of the division of
labor in reconstruction in COIN is problematic on
three levels. First, it places the tactical commander
in a real quandary about how to prepare for accomplishing reconstruction tasks in a COIN environment.
Whipsawed back and forth between the counsel to
be prepared to do everything but deferring to civilians whenever possible, a commander might well be
excused for being inclined to err on the side of more
preparation, and that is what most will do—until they
take full measure of the universe of tasks for which
they must prepare, which is offered in the doctrine
without any particularly useful guidelines about how
to establish the relative priority of these tasks. The second problem is the understandable conclusion that a
young leader might draw from a reading of the doctrine that most of the tasks that should be left to civil-
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ian organizations and agencies will end up devolving
on tactical unit commanders. The suggestion to commanders is that civilian agencies will usually not be
able to hold up their end of the mission, and therefore
soldiers will have to be prepared to pick up the slack.
A full understanding of the relative capabilities, missions, and competencies of civilian agencies involved
in reconstruction with respect to their military partners usually can put this observation in perspective.
But experienced practitioners who are willing to be
honest about attitudes that are derived from this perception are well aware of the corrosive effects that are
associated with it. Finally, and related to the first two
problems, military commanders who have prepared
the best that they can for complex reconstruction tasks
in COIN and who encounter a vacuum on the battlefield somewhere within the reconstruction effort,
having been encouraged by their reading of current
doctrine, are apt to jump into the breach. At times this
may be the necessary and the right thing to do. But
inherent in this approach is also the significant risk
of doing more harm than would be done if no action
were taken at all, especially in complex situations requiring experience and expertise that is not normally
resident in tactical units.
Fourth, it follows from this discussion of responsibilities in the doctrine that there will be issues that
will emerge related to “who’s in charge?” of the overall reconstruction effort being conducted in support
of COIN. Here, an attempt made in FM 3-07 to shed
some light on a related matter actually highlights the
problems that will inevitably occur and the need for
dedicated and agreed upon mechanisms to manage
reconstruction in COIN. The manual states that:
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Reconstruction is the process of rebuilding degraded,
damaged, or destroyed political, socioeconomic, and
physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for long-term development.
Stabilization is the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and
a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful long-term development.
Together, reconstruction and stabilization comprise the
broad range of activities defined by the Department of Defense as stability operations.13

Introduction of the term “reconstruction and stabilization” is part of a well-intentioned attempt made in
FM 3-07 to make some connection between work that
is now being done in the civilian community and the
closely related established military doctrine on stability operations and COIN.14 But, besides raising the issue of how the reader of FM 3-07 is to make any meaningful distinction between these two processes based
on the description of reconstruction and stabilization
provided in this paragraph (which risks doing some
damage to the later attempt in the manual to clearly
define reconstruction), the discussion will no doubt
be perplexing to the military readers in that the exact
form and substance of a type of operation that is critical to successful COIN (that is, stability operations,
which have recently been elevated to “a core U.S. military mission” in DoDD 3000.05) will be determined
by the Secretary of State, who has been designated by
the President in NSPD-44 as having the responsibility “to coordinate and strengthen efforts of the United
States Government to prepare, plan for, and conduct
reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related
activities.”15
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Finally, a survey of the existing doctrine leaves the
reader feeling a real need for more on how to integrate
the reconstruction effort with other military actions
being taken in COIN in order to achieve maximum effect on the populace and the insurgent. The number
and complexity of tasks, multiple agencies and organizations that are involved, confusing lines of responsibility, and the issues raised about who will manage
reconstruction on the battlefield does not bode well
for a coordinated, coherent effort that can be integrated with combat operations to meet the objectives of a
COIN campaign. It would be easy to understand why,
after a reading of existing doctrine on reconstruction
in COIN, a reader might be left looking for something
beyond the theoretical and philosophical—a framework of sorts that helps him better understand the
nature of reconstruction in COIN and how it works.
In the 1980s and 1990s when doctrine writers were
facing a similar complex conceptual challenge to understand and explain the integration of multiple actions on the battlefield, they developed the “battlefield operating systems” (BOS), each of which was
described in terms of a “concept” (for example, a concept of fires or concept of support) that has proven extraordinarily useful and familiar to all practitioners of
combined arms operations to this day. To understand
and explain how to coordinate and synchronize the
reconstruction effort with combat and security operations in COIN—where the need for integration is, if
anything, even more critical—some parallel construct
to the BOS, or a concept of reconstruction, could be
useful.
As is usually the case, the practitioners of COIN—
military and civilian—are generally not waiting for
more doctrine or additional guidance to help them
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deal with these conceptual issues. They are, for the
most part, moving out and finding innovative and
creative ways to deal with them. But these approaches
are ad hoc and therefore only imperfectly captured
and shared with others who are facing the same challenges. Additionally, without some sort of recognized
Army concept of reconstruction it is difficult to make
some of the key manning, equipping, and training
decisions that are necessary to assist commanders to
use this valuable tool on the COIN battlefield. So the
development of an Army concept of reconstruction,
within the context of the larger reconstruction effort that must take place in successful COIN, might
not only enhance the effectiveness of tactical units in
battle but would also assist the Army’s leadership to
make better choices about how to set these units up
for success in their efforts.
No single analyst or doctrine writer could outline
the parameters of a construct of reconstruction better
than a group of practitioners called together to tackle
a tough set of problems in a COIN environment. As
part of the process of writing this monograph, the author included an attempt to make use of just such a
resource. The results are described in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
CONDUCTING RECONSTRUCTION IN
COUNTERINSURGENCY
—AN EXERCISE
In an attempt to gain a greater understanding of the
conduct of reconstruction operations in counterinsurgency beyond what is currently available in doctrine,
and to identify some of the corresponding implications for agencies which are part of the reconstruction effort, especially the Army, a tabletop war game
was conducted over a 1-month period in the spring of
2009. Participants were solicited based on their knowledge of and experience in the key agencies involved in
past and likely future reconstruction operations. The
author acted as the moderator and exercise director,
and was assisted in this effort by the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.1
The exercise was conducted in five “turns”: Turn
1, Receipt of a basic scenario and analysis by participants; Turn 2, Identification of the key reconstruction
tasks; Turn 3, Identification of responsibilities for
key tasks, by agency; Turn 4, Matching capabilities
to tasks, identifying shortfalls, discussion of possible
ways to address a shortfall in capability; and Turn 5,
Collection of feedback from participants, and moderator questions and follow up based on review of all input; and issue identification.
THE SCENARIO
To generate feedback from player agencies, a base
scenario was designed that described conditions in
a nation typical of those found by the United States
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in past COIN and related operations, and which are
likely to be similar to those that will be encountered
during future operations.2
Country X is an underdeveloped nation that has
recently emerged from a period of significant civil
strife. A new government has been installed to carry
the nation into upcoming democratic elections, which
will be the first in the nation’s history. Country X is
generally at peace with its neighbors; there is no significant threat of outside intervention or attack from
across the nation’s boundaries. The interim government and all major political parties are viewed by the
United States as being friendly and supportive of U.S.
interests in the region. The recent history of civil strife
has created some immediate and fairly significant
humanitarian concerns—small refugee camps have
sprung up and are experiencing shortages of food, basic sanitation, and potable water. At present, there is
no major presence of international organizations (IOs)
or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) based on
security concerns described below.
The political situation in Country X is fairly typical
of an underdeveloped nation emerging from a prolonged period of civil strife. Governance at all levels
in the nation is weak and largely ineffectual. National
ministries are lacking in capability due to the scarcity
of experienced government personnel and underdeveloped bureaucracies. There is a noticeable lack of
communication between activities and organizations
at the national level and between the national government and governments at the provincial level and
lower. Despite these facts the national government is
cautiously well-received by the people, the majority
being willing to wait and see if the government will be
able to deliver to meet their basic needs. However, the
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problem of corruption represents a significant challenge to the legitimacy and acceptability of the government at the national and local level.
Country X is a rural nation whose economy is
based primarily on agriculture. The nation has a legacy of central government control of the economy and
commercial activities. Agricultural collectives and
most major factories are state owned. Civil strife has
produced significant disruptions to Country X’s economy, aggravated by the damage done to the nation’s
infrastructure and its poor state of maintenance—systems that support supplies of electricity, potable water, sewage, and transportation (especially roads) are
all in need of repair. There have been some initiatives
aimed at stimulating growth of small businesses, but,
after some early successes, there has been no larger
scale push to expand the effort due to a shortage of investment capital from within the nation or from international sources. Government at the national and local
levels has proven unable to execute the small budgets
that they have developed, revenues for which come
mostly from income generated by agricultural exports
and donations from abroad, to include IOs and NGOs.
The security situation in Country X is unstable. In
the wake of the civil strife that has recently subsided,
several small factions that felt disenfranchised by the
negotiated solution have started to resist efforts by the
central government to extend its reach and domain
over the more remote regions of the country, and some
groups have taken up arms. Security of Country X’s
borders against large scale infiltration or armed attack
is not a concern, but the national army and police are
undermanned, ill equipped, and poorly trained for
the purposes of defeating any large-scale armed internal resistance movement or maintaining civil control
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or order. Corruption is a problem in both the army
and the police force. The rule of law is in poor shape.
Though a body of established law is in effect, there is
no functioning system of jurisprudence, and detention
and correctional facilities are overwhelmed and in a
bad state of repair and maintenance.
Province Y is one of the most developed provinces
in the country, but the nation’s larger challenges have
not bypassed its population, and the nation’s biggest
security concerns are focused there. The provincial
government’s ability to function has been hindered by
violence and political isolation from the central government. Armed conflict has resulted in considerable
damage to buildings, homes, and religious centers, especially in the smaller towns and villages of Province Y.
There are two ethnic groups in the province. “Reds”
make up the bulk of the population, and “Blues” are
a minority group located mostly in the north. (Reds
and Blues are about equally represented in the population of Country X at large, with the current national
government being run by a Red-Blue coalition.). The
insurgency got its start in Blueland (an ethnic region
that includes a portion of Province Y and spans an
international border), and most of the remaining insurgents are Blues or foreign fighters whom they have
harbored in their midst. The insurgency is made more
complex by the existence of a tribal system which,
though weakened by decades of war, is still the dominant structure of governance at levels below the province. Though political party affiliation is loosely tied
to tribal affiliation, partisan politics based on ethnic or
tribal struggle has not yet become a source of significant strife or violence.
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The resistance in Country X, especially in province
Y, is taking on the characteristics of a classical insurgency. Opposition forces are beginning to exploit the
apparent failures of the central government to deliver
essential services to the people. There has been a rise
in insurgent attacks on government facilities and,
in some cases, public places in an attempt to prove
the government’s inability to secure the population.
Country X’s insurgents have begun to appeal to international terrorist organizations for support, and some
of these have begun to take credit for a few of the more
high profile attacks against the government and people of Country X. Certain portions of the population
have become impatient with Country X’s inability to
effectively address the growing insurgent threat and
provide security and basic services for the people.
These groups are increasingly unsupportive of the
government, and in some cases have begun to aid the
insurgency, or at least will not actively work against
it. Periodic outbreaks of rioting and several instances
of public disorder have started to occur.
Country X has made an appeal to the United States
for military intervention to support the new transitional government and facilitate the conduct of elections.
Judging that the declining security situation, increasing instability, and growing insurgency are creating
the conditions for international extremist groups to
gain a foothold and potential sanctuary within Country X, the United States has agreed to provide military
forces, supported by capabilities from appropriate
government agencies, to launch a COIN campaign as
part of a larger international effort that is underway.
A U.S. Joint Task Force (JTF) has been established and
committed to the Multinational Force (MNF), which is
led by a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
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commander. The JTF consists of 2 Army brigades and
one U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), plus conventional and special
operations enablers. The JTF commander reports to
both the MNF commander and the U.S. ambassador
to Country X. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has committed to supporting the
operation with development experts and teams. Other
civilian agencies have indicated their willingness to
send experts, but specific requests have not yet been
made by the ambassador. Province Y is the area of
operations assigned to the U.S. JTF by the MNF commander. Funding for military operations includes a
specific line for a Commander’s Emergency Response
Program (CERP). Funds have also been approved for
USAID programs, and the Department of State (DoS)
has been granted funding to support reconstruction
projects. These funds will be controlled by a DoS Reconstruction Management Office operating out of the
embassy. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers will support the reconstruction effort by providing assistance
with project management.
Working from this basic scenario, the tabletop
players were asked to develop the components of a
reconstruction plan that would be an integral part of
the COIN effort. There was no specific, interactive
role to simulate the integration of offensive and defensive combat operations and reconstruction. When
such feedback was deemed necessary, it was provided based on the best estimate of the moderator.
The tabletop players used the doctrinal definition of
reconstruction to support their actions and deliberations: “The process of rebuilding degraded, damaged,
or destroyed political, socioeconomic, and physical
infrastructure of a country or territory to create the
foundation for long-term development.”3
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Through their game play and feedback, they provided insights and analysis about some of the key factors related to reconstruction and COIN, the requirements that the JTF would face, capabilities to meet
those requirements, and the best way to match the
two. The participants’ observations came back repeatedly to the most pressing matters that practitioners of
reconstruction in COIN face—the specific challenges
and tasks, responsibilities for these tasks, approaches
to accomplishing tasks, capability shortfalls, and key
issues that face the various agencies involved in a reconstruction effort, individually and collectively. The
following observations, findings, and corresponding
implications for the interagency community, with a
focus on the Army as a critical player in that community, emerged from the exercise.
OBSERVATIONS
Discussion of Key Tasks, Priorities, and
Responsibilities.
There is very little disagreement between the respective players about the reconstruction tasks that
face the JTF in Country X. The tasks that they identify
are very similar to the inventory found in the new FM
3.07 or the ones drawn from the more detailed lists
found in scholarly studies dedicated specifically to
reconstruction.4 Expressed and described in several
different ways, nonetheless the discussion of tasks begins with security and then proceeds to four general
categories of reconstruction tasks: public order and
rule of law, essential services, economic development,
and governance. The discussion below captures many
of the salient points raised by game participants about
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the nature of the tasks themselves, assigning them a
priority, how they might be sequenced in a COIN campaign plan, and how and by whom the tasks might be
accomplished. As would be expected, though there is
general agreement on which tasks will need to be addressed, there are differences of opinion on other matters, largely because of the diversity of the group and
the different agencies represented.
Security. These are universally seen as first-order
tasks that must be accomplished to suppress or reduce levels of violence and restore stability, at least
in the near term, for effective reconstruction to proceed. Players view the ability to establish a stable environment across Country X or at least in Province Y
as being ideal, but if that proves impossible, then a
coordinated effort between reconstruction and military operations in order to secure areas that will be
the focus of the first reconstruction efforts should be
undertaken. Security is generally viewed by both the
military and civilian players as being a prerequisite
for successful reconstruction, but, consistent with
what has been observed in Iraq and Afghanistan,
there are different ideas about when to initiate reconstruction projects that depend on the different views
of how security and reconstruction are best integrated
to achieve desired effects.
The military players generally press for early initiation of reconstruction tasks, seeing them as being a
key step to achieving security itself. The comment is
made by a former battalion commander that certain
reconstruction activities, if effective, could “get them
to stop shooting at our guys.”5 Therefore, military
players place a high priority on those tasks that can
be initiated in Province Y early on to win hearts and
minds and support combat operations to defeat the in-
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surgents—even if that means that the vast majority of
those tasks will need to be accomplished by the military forces themselves.
Understandably, civilian agencies are wary of any
early large scale reconstruction given the unstable environment in Province Y, and also leery of any reconstruction that might be attempted too hastily. These
agencies, especially USAID, place a higher emphasis
on early efforts to understand the problems facing the
government of Country X that, in turn, are feeding the
insurgency. They encourage early conduct of such actions as surveys, interviews, and engagements with
the local population in order to understand the fundamental problems before attempting to solve them.
The concern is that reconstruction that is not informed
by an understanding of the sources of violence will be
wasteful, or worse, counterproductive to the overall
U.S. effort in Country X.
Public Order and the Rule of Law. This category includes tasks associated with public safety and control,
order, and the ability to enforce the law; that is, make
arrests, detain those who are suspected to have broken
the law, try them in accordance with a generally recognized and respected body of laws, carry out punishments, and accomplish all of this in an environment
free of intimidation, coercion, or corruption. Again, all
players agree that, after security, the establishment of
public order and the rule of law is critical to further
reconstruction efforts. But, given the state of development and the turmoil associated with the recent civil
conflict in Country X, this is viewed by players as a
most difficult set of tasks to accomplish, requiring time
and a wide range of skills and knowledge that in most
cases is very specific to that country. It was observed
that there is no one department in the U.S. Government that is particularly well-suited or positioned to
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take on these tasks. Players expressed some concern
based on past personal experience that, when multiple
agencies have been called upon to address these tasks,
mostly ad hoc approaches will be attempted in Country X, and they will bring only very limited successes.
Essential Services, Public Utilities, and Infrastructure.
There is a strong sense that immediate needs of the
local population like these must be identified and addressed as a first order of business—electricity, clean
water, sewage, and other necessities that will support
at least a marginal standard of living and reasonable
public health in Country X, or at least in Province Y.
Military players point out that, especially in this area,
the ability to bring relief to the suffering of the indigenous population by addressing these needs will have
a strong positive influence on efforts to win over the
population and gain their cooperation as counterinsurgency operations are conducted—or at least be a
factor that might prevent the local people from supporting the insurgency. Public works projects are also
viewed as being a large source of employment for
military aged males, providing them with a source of
income and drawing them away from the ranks of the
insurgents.
Other players, especially the former district commanders from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers who
all have extensive experience with the reconstruction
of infrastructure in COIN, cautioned that an enduring
solution to the challenge of providing essential services, though clearly a desirable goal, might not be a
feasible way to win hearts and minds in the near term.
The lack of essential services in Country X is connected to a national infrastructure that will require extensive rebuilding, which entails large, time consuming
projects, requiring technical expertise, that generally
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do not lend themselves readily to the employment
of large numbers of unskilled indigenous workers.
Additionally, these projects will place additional demands on the security and police forces of Country X
and the JTF forces since they provide a very lucrative
target for sabotage and insurgent attack. Some players
note that quickly emplaced temporary measures (for
example, portable generators or bottled water) might
be attempted in lieu of undertaking the demands of
a longer term more enduring solution, at least in the
initial stages of the counterinsurgency.
Economic Development. Viewed as perhaps the major cause of discontent among the population of Country X and one of the most critical structural issues
needing early attention, players have varying views
about which of the primary components of economic
development should take priority, given limited relevant resources available to the U.S. JTF. Many view
programs dedicated to generating jobs in Province
Y as being the top priority for agencies dedicated to
economic development, USAID being considered the
principal organization with this type of capability. But
there is general recognition that most of this type of
work will have only a marginal effect on lasting development goals in Country X. Nonetheless, trash pickup, quick fix projects, extensive use of manual labor
in public works efforts and the like are viewed as being critical, especially by the military players, to win
the support of the population and provide employment to fighting age males who might otherwise find
a ready source of income by joining the insurgency.
CERP funding (discussed later) is viewed as perhaps
the quickest way to fund these activities, and doing so
is viewed by all as an appropriate use of such monies.
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However, there is also a generally recognized
need to undertake more fundamental economic reform and financial and monetary measures that might
address the root economic causes of the violence in
Country X. Microloans and microgrants at the local
level to start up small businesses, especially those in
the agricultural sector, are suggested as ways to get
economic activity going rapidly. Providing seeds for
fast growing crops or technical and medical assistance
to families that are raising animals in Province Y can
set the conditions for more extensive agricultural and
perhaps other business development as the security
situation improves. Players view a need for an effort
to attract international investment to Country X while
recognizing that interest will depend on the ability to
establish a stable and relatively secure environment
for that investment.
Finally, there are cautions expressed by several
players that early efforts at job creation and economic
revitalization, designed to generate employment and
win hearts and minds quickly, should not be undertaken at cross purposes with or at the expense of
necessary longer-term economic projects. Players recommend making careful choices about “make-work”
type projects which, though successful in the effort to
generate temporary employment, might ultimately
divert necessary resources from activities that could
bring longer-term benefits in terms of both development objectives and enduring jobs. An example might
be the choice involving starting labor-intensive “last
mile” electricity projects (repairing the wiring and
putting in connections to households) undertaken in
a town located in Province Y without careful consideration given to the state of infrastructure repair at
large in Country X. Though such a project might well
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employ military age males, if undertaken without regard for the broader economic development plan, the
results might be not only be wasteful but could have
the effects of diverting resources needed to bring electricity to an economic development zone built around
businesses and industry that will need electricity to
operate in another part of Province Y.
Governance. Successful coalition efforts to meet
the above needs will not be enough. There is general
agreement that the COIN effort will ultimately fail unless the basic needs of the people are being met by the
governments of Country X and Province Y. Participants also agree that the first efforts to establish good
governance in Province Y and at subprovincial levels
should be a bottom up effort—the initial focus being
on the mechanisms of government closest to the people, but that this bottom up approach should not be
at the expense of the credibility of the central government of Country X. The risk of this effect is definitely
present in Province Y. Efforts to improve governance
in the province might well have the effect of winning
loyalty for local governments while building animosity for the central government of Country X, given the
lack of experience and ineffectiveness of the ministries
of the central government. The need to convince the
population that their government can deliver for them
and is worthy of their trust and confidence is viewed
as being essential to the overall effort. Of course, the
challenge faced by the coalition is a well-known one:
The government in Country X actually cannot deliver
for the people (it lacks the capacity and the reach to do
so) and in many ways the central government does not
deserve the trust and confidence of the people (being
largely ineffectual and corrupt).
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The required solution—to “build good governance”—seems problematic to players on many levels. First, military units which will generally be the
first to feel the effects of inadequate governance (a
disgruntled population produces fuel for the insurgency) have very little resident expertise or familiarity with how to establish the instrumentalities of good
government. Agencies that do have such experience
(for example, USAID) note that the security conditions required to execute their governance programs
must permit a certain freedom of action and movement, and they understandably have concerns about
the safety of their personnel.
RELATED CONCLUSIONS
1. Players point out that at several points, but especially early in the operation, there is a need to have
more information so as to make intelligent choices
about the reconstruction effort. Part of this lack of
information can be attributed to imperfections in the
description of the scenario that was provided. But
some of these requests for more information indicated
the types of information that key agencies must have
before they begin a reconstruction mission in regions
affected by insecurity and instability. This observation supports the need for maintaining information on
political, economic, and social factors that will affect
reconstruction efforts in select nations, or developing
an early-entry capability to gather such information as
a first order of business. One player suggests the deployment of reconstruction survey teams or “scouts”
who are tasked to answer questions or collect information that will support the work of other agencies
or organizations arriving in Country X later in the deployment flow.
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2. The difficult nature of these tasks and the need
to approach them in a coherent and coordinated way
raises the issue of organizing the reconstruction effort.
Though there is general agreement among the players
on what needs to be accomplished, there is a general
recognition that there will be disagreements on how
to accomplish these tasks—establishing priorities, sequencing tasks, assigning responsibilities, assessment
measures, and the like. This problem manifests itself
on two levels—at the theater (Province Y) level where
the challenges are mostly about management of the
effort, and at the tactical (subprovincial or local) level
where the biggest issues concern execution.
The utility of having some set of standard practices or a template for master planning or managing the conduct of national reconstruction to guide
the interagency effort in Country X is noted. Players
comment that the problem is exacerbated because the
contributions of international and nongovernmental
organizations will be difficult to account for, as will
the contributions to be made by host nation activities
in Country X.
At the local level, there is a need for a mechanism
to execute the reconstruction effort. The lack of any
standard approach to coordinating reconstruction efforts at the tactical or local level in Province Y limits
the ability of commanders, development experts, and
others involved in the effort to maintain visibility,
monitor, or assess the work that is being done overall
by the various activities in the province. There is also
no means to ensure that efforts are mutually reinforcing, or, at least, deconflicted. It follows naturally that
synchronizing the reconstruction effort with the security operations of military forces becomes very difficult.
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3. Likewise, in terms of the reconstruction effort in
Country X writ large, all players note that there is no
indication of organizations, U.S. or coalition, that have
been established specifically to manage the reconstruction effort at the national level, a condition which
is generally consistent with their experiences in actual
theaters of operation. Thus, the matter of overall coordination of the component activities of the reconstruction effort in Country X will be problematic.
Players indicate that organizing for the planning
and management of reconstruction in Country X will
need to be considered on at least three levels: first, at
a policy level, most likely in Washington where the
overall strategy for reconstruction of Country X would
be planned, priorities established, and resources made
available; second, at the theater level, where the JTF
commander’s campaign plan should be synchronized
with the objectives of the reconstruction effort ongoing in Country X; and third, at the level of execution,
where tactical units and reconstruction agencies will
be required to collaborate on priorities, establish mutually supporting local or tactical objectives for the
area, and support each other in the management of
key projects.
Naturally, given these requirements for coordination, the issue of “who will be in charge?” comes up
regularly. Beyond the broad guidance in NSPD-44
which gives the Secretary of State the policy lead for
reconstruction and stabilization, there is a need for
clarity about who will make decisions, give guidance
and direction, and set priorities for interagency reconstruction activities in Country X.
4. There is significant agreement that reconstruction efforts need to be organized around two central
purposes related to counterinsurgency—first, to win
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hearts and minds by providing for the needs of the
population, thus demonstrating that cooperation with
the coalition (identified, as it must be, as supporting
the central government of Country X) will bring advantages to the people that the insurgents will not be
able to provide; and second, to address fundamental
structural and developmental problems of national
and local government, the economy, rule of law, national infrastructure systems, and other issues that
are giving the insurgents a cause upon which to build
support for their efforts. Players generally concur
that in Country X and Province Y addressing these
fundamental problems should be the province of the
civilian agencies with expertise in the various areas
of development. But some players (mostly military)
express doubt that these agencies will be able to act
quickly enough to affect the course of the COIN in its
early stages. Therefore, military players, especially
those with a civil affairs background, are inclined to
advocate for military units to undertake some of the
longer term, capacity building activities (especially
at the local level) even while acknowledging that the
comparative advantage in these areas rests with civilian agencies.
The tradeoff between the need to demonstrate that
the government is delivering for the people and the
time sensitivity of showing progress in the near term,
especially at the local level, is of concern to the players, especially given the relative inexperience of the
national and local governments and their respective
bureaucracies. This tradeoff also carries over to discussion of the relative importance of two key groups
of tasks—those that can be executed quickly, are high
profile, and are designed primarily to highlight the
government’s ability to deliver by making efforts to
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“put the Country X face on it,” and the longer term,
more enduring capacity building effort, whereby institutions are built and strengthened so that the government is able to sustain its performance over a period
of time. Ideally, capacity building can start early and
progress quickly so that the governments of Country
X and Province Y can begin to perform and provide
for their population; in practice, capacity building has
been difficult to execute. So there will be a strong inclination for the JTF in Province Y to focus on highly visible, short-term reconstruction work, ideally assisting
from a standpoint that allows them to remain “over
the horizon.” Capacity building activities followed by
host nation management of projects and programs is
likely to be a lesser priority in the early stages of the
mission.
5. There is also a sense that, given the relative advantages that Province Y has over other portions of
Country X and the potential benefits that will accrue to
the deployment of a large U.S. contingent, reconstruction, development and reform within the province
might be realized more quickly than at the national
level. This could have a salutary effect on progress
throughout Country X if Province Y is viewed as a
model to be emulated elsewhere in the nation. But
there is also a chance that the disparity could become
an additional source of conflict if the effects are not
managed carefully. Additionally, trying to drive the
reconstruction effort in Country X from the bottom up
runs the risk of bolstering the support of Province Y’s
population for their local leaders at the expense of the
credibility and perception of the central government.
6. Military and civilian players note that they have
a good understanding of the capabilities of other
agencies involved in reconstruction, and thus they can
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make certain calculations about their requirements
based on their knowledge of others’ likely contributions. But many note that they (the players) are experienced practitioners of reconstruction, and that the resident knowledge in their agencies or units (especially
in the military) does not support accurate assessments
of the likely needs of other agencies or the capabilities
that they bring to the effort that might be leveraged.
For example, Army units entering an area of operations in Province Y are well versed in what tasks they
need to accomplish to conduct counterinsurgency operations. But they might not be aware that the USAID
teams that will be working in the same area have
information requirements that, if filled beforehand,
will facilitate the work of USAID once their personnel
are able to enter the province and begin work. Civilian agencies view the military as having the greatest
ability to shape the course of the reconstruction effort
initially, owing to their greater ability to operate right
away under the security conditions as they stand, their
ample resources, and the flexibility with which they
can employ them (especially CERP money). Military
players generally overestimate the resources available
to civilian agencies for reconstruction, and opinions in
the military about the flexibility of the CERP program
tend to vary based on the experiences of the individual player providing the observation.
7. All players note the importance of coordinating
the coalition’s reconstruction work with that of IOs
and NGOs that are present in Country X, but generally feel that it is not reasonable to expect extensive
cooperation from or coordination with these organizations, especially when it comes to activities that
can be perceived as work that they are doing with the
U.S. military. Players from the U.S. civilian agencies
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who have standing relationships with IOs and NGOs
observe that this fact must also be a consideration in
how they do business with the military, lest identification of the agencies of the U.S. Government with coalition military interfere with their ability to work with
NGOs or IOs.
8. Several players, especially those with experience
working with USAID, note that Country X in general
and Province Y specifically might well benefit from
the involvement of private enterprise in the areas of
investment, economic revitalization, and development. One player suggests that U.S. private businesses
might be convinced to support a broader effort to promote economic activity in Country X, an approach that
has been attempted in both Iraq and Afghanistan with
mixed results. These players point to the desirability
of having some organization or mechanism that can be
included as part of the coalition’s overall reconstruction effort that is charged specifically with facilitating
contacts between U.S. business and financial concerns
and the appropriate entities within Country X.
9. Though not specifically treated in the scenario,
players express concern about measures of effectiveness, based on the lack of any mention of them in the
narrative and on experience they have had with them
in Afghanistan and Iraq. The first order issue is establishing a useful relationship between these measures
and actual progress on the ground in the reconstruction and security arena in a way that tells the leaders
of the JTF something about progress towards overall
campaign goals. Another issue is reconciling measures of effectiveness and milestones being tracked
by the JTF with those most important to Country X.
Given certain conditions described in the scenario, it
is anticipated that the two may not coincide.

74

Taken with the observations drawn from a review
of the history of reconstruction in counterinsurgency
operations and a review of current doctrine, these
insights from the tabletop exercise and the conclusions
that flow from them suggest some issue areas that deserve attention in order to enhance the effectiveness
of reconstruction in COIN. Some of these areas and
certain measures to address them involve the whole
of government approach to reconstruction. Any Army
initiatives to improve the effectiveness of its contributions to the reconstruction effort must be considered
in that context. The next chapter recommends an overall concept of reconstruction that would, if adopted by
the interagency community, produce a more coherent
and coordinated holistic effort, and allow the Army
to consider recommendations, presented in Chapter 6,
designed to optimize its contributions to reconstruction in COIN.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4
1. Special thanks for their support of and participation in
the exercise goes to Ambassador Joe Saloom (U.S. Department
of State); Elena Brineman (USAID); the U.S. Army Peacekeeping
and Stability Operations Institute (Colonel John Kardos, Director,
along with Thomas Dempsey, Bryan Grover, Richard Megahan,
Michael Moon); the Center for a New American Security (John
Nagl, President, along with Colonels James Crider and Michael
Garrett, who were military fellows at the time of the exercise); and
Debra Lewis, Bob Vasta, Ron Light, and Rick Jenkins, all past regional commanders in the Gulf Region Division, Iraq, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers.
2. Some of the conditions described in the scenario used in
the exercise are drawn from an early draft of the Nangarhar case
study that, in its final form, appears in Chap. 2 of Gompert et al.,
Reconstruction Under Fire. However, the scenario depicts a fictional situation and is not meant to describe circumstances in Nan-
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garhar or in Afghanistan. Information from that scenario is used
in this monograph by permission of Dr. Kelly. Special thanks to
Michelle Parker who is the author of the Nangahar case study in
the book.
3. Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations, Washington,
DC: Department of the Army, p. Glossary-9.
4. Conrad Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq:
Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army
War College, February, 2003, especially Appendix A.
5. As quoted in email message to the author.
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CHAPTER 5
A FRAMEWORK FOR RECONSTRUCTION
IN COUNTERINSURGENCY
To this point, a review of the history of the role that
reconstruction has played in warfare since the beginning of the 20th century, a survey of the most current
and relevant doctrine and other writings on counterinsurgency (COIN), and the experiences of modern
practitioners in ongoing overseas operations makes it
possible to draw these conclusions about reconstruction and the role that it plays in COIN warfare:
• First, our conception of what reconstruction
is and its role in war has evolved over time.
Whereas it has previously been thought of almost exclusively in terms of rebuilding after war
has ended, increasingly in the post-World War
II period, various U.S. experiences have caused
us to view reconstruction as an integral part of
war, especially of COIN operations. That said,
general acceptance of reconstruction as part of
warfare has not been universal. Whereas there
have been strong advocates of its importance
in an overall COIN effort, there has also been
much resistance to “nation building” on the
grounds that it takes military forces away from
their core responsibilities (“war fighting”) and
therefore constitutes a form of “mission creep.”
•	Second, emerging U.S. Army and Joint doctrine
is very clear about the critical role that reconstruction plays in successful COIN operations.
Current doctrine on Joint and Army operations
holds that reconstruction must be considered as
at least equal to—if not more important than—
other functions or lines of operation in COIN.
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•	Third, that there is complete agreement across
the U.S. Government that reconstruction must
be an interagency effort. There is also agreement across agencies about the key tasks that
should be included in a reconstruction effort in
support of COIN. But as yet there is no clearly stated or agreed upon concept or common
framework that can serve as a guide for the key
activities of all relevant players from the interagency community to assist in coordinating a
whole of government reconstruction effort, and
integrating it with the other elements of successful COIN.
The U.S. Government has consistently fallen short
in its attempts to organize for and implement reconstruction in a way that has led to an effective or efficient use of resources dedicated to that purpose.1
For that reason, reconstruction has had a suboptimal
impact in COIN campaigns undertaken by the United
States. It is difficult to estimate how far short of the
mark the effort has fallen because there is also no clear
set of established measures that have been used to
account for the contribution that reconstruction has
made in U.S. COIN campaigns. But it is hard to argue against some sort of reform or change in the way
reconstruction in support of COIN should be managed and conducted. Though most agencies involved
in reconstruction are working hard to identify basic
principles, offer recommendations on various ways
to organize to manage and implement reconstruction,
and attempt to collect lessons learned that are mostly
drawn from ad hoc approaches attempted in recent
COIN operations, this work is proceeding largely in
the absence of any agreed upon organizing framework
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or concept of reconstruction—a fact which threatens to
limit the utility of any conclusions that might emerge.
It follows that successful integration of reconstruction
into Army COIN operations will require more than
just internal measures taken to enhance its own ability
to contribute to an overall reconstruction effort. The
larger, holistic framework for whole of government
reconstruction must continue to evolve and develop.
THE FRAMEWORK: A CONCEPT FOR
RECONSTRUCTION
An agreed upon concept of reconstruction to guide
planning, preparation for, and execution of reconstruction operations in support of COIN will be of
great benefit, if not essential, to this evolution. Such
a concept could guide the actions of all participating
agencies in order that they be coordinated and synchronized in support of an overall COIN campaign
plan. The operational concept should include the following five components:
1. A statement of the purpose of reconstruction;
2. A description of the essential elements;
3. A general sequence/scheme of reconstruction
activities;
4. Guidelines for assigning responsibilities;
5. Guidelines for assessment of a reconstruction effort.
An outline of a concept that treats these components can be drawn from a study of history, existing
directives, current doctrine, relevant studies, and the
work of various agencies and organizations that are
studying the attendant issues. The following discussion draws from many such sources, compiling this
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work, and drawing logical conclusions from some of
the best thinking being done on reconstruction to posit a form of framework for reconstruction that will be
relevant to all departments and agencies. Naturally,
if adopted, this concept will have implications for the
Army’s doctrine, organization, training, and equipment. These implications are the subject of Chapter 6.
Purpose of Reconstruction.
Building the concept proceeds from the previous
discussion of the two purposes of reconstruction,
which, though they are related, must be considered
as distinct, a premise which has profound impact on
further development of a concept.
The first purpose of reconstruction is to provide
incentives to the local population to support the counterinsurgent and withdraw their support from the insurgent. This will be accomplished if reconstruction
projects and programs are viewed as attractive to the
population or meeting some immediate need, and that
cooperation with the counterinsurgent will bring more
of the same, or alternatively, that failure to cooperate
will bring an end to the benefit being received. Actions
to this end are normally time and conditions sensitive,
and their effectiveness is directly proportional to the
ability of the population to identify the benefits with
the counterinsurgent force. In short, reconstruction
must win the hearts and minds of the population.
The second purpose of reconstruction is to address
the fundamental sources of instability or discontent
that are the incipient cause of the insurgency itself.
This will generally be accomplished by addressing
certain failures of legitimate governments or other
authorities to provide for the basic needs of the popu-
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lation and will necessarily involve programs of capacity building or reform that are inherently longer-term
efforts, requiring the expertise of functional experts
or mentors. As capacity grows and the needs of the
people are more regularly and consistently met, the
legitimacy of the host nation government in the eyes
of the population increases, and support for that government grows. Fulfilling this second purpose of reconstruction requires the counterinsurgent coalition
to lead a nation building effort.
Essential Elements of Reconstruction.
An analyst can go to any one of several sources
to find discussions of the elements of reconstruction,
which is part of the challenge in arriving at a consensus on what exactly reconstruction is. Beyond just
the need for conceptual clarity, a commonly accepted
understanding of the essential elements of reconstruction—one that is best distilled from these sources—is
called for before key decisions about an executable
concept, responsibilities, and resourcing can be developed:
•	It is useful to begin with National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, which provides
guidance to the interagency community on the
management of reconstruction and stabilization, and lists the component elements as being
activities designed “to promote peace, security,
development, democratic practices, market
economies, and the rule of law.”2
•	The U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide
was developed by the Bureau of PoliticalMilitary Affairs in the Department of State,
co-signed by the Secretaries of Defense and
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State and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID), and
released in January 2009. Though mostly descriptive of the characteristics of insurgency
and COIN, it is the only document approved
by these three departments that treats the elements of reconstruction. In what is portrayed
as “a comprehensive approach to COIN,” the
guide describes two “imperatives”—political
(“the key function” in COIN) and security—
both of which must be addressed with “equal
urgency.” Three other “components of COIN”
are included in the formulation—economic, information, and control.3
•	DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.05, Military Support
for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, describes reconstruction
as follows: “The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs.
The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a
viable market economy, rule of law, democratic
institutions, and a robust civil society.”4
•	Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, describes stability operations (as a component of full spectrum operations) in Chapter 3 and presents a
crosswalk of “stability tasks” as described in
military doctrine (establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services,
support to governance, support to economic
and infrastructure development) with the
“post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization
sectors” that are recognized by the Department
of State (security, justice and reconciliation,
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humanitarian assistance and social well-being,
governance and participation, economic stabilization and infrastructure).5
•	As previously cited, the glossary of Field
Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations, defines
reconstruction as “the process of rebuilding
degraded, damaged, or destroyed political
socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure of
a country or territory to create the foundation
for long term development.”6 Since FM 3-07 is
the “proponent manual” for this definition, it
stands for all Services in the Department of Defense (DoD).
•	Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency,
makes mention of reconstruction in numerous
places, but provides no definition and does not
include a separate list of what constitutes reconstruction tasks.
•	There are various professional studies that include detailed discussions of reconstruction
tasks. One of the best is a thesis published by
the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army
War College and written by Dr. Conrad Crane
and Dr. W. Andrew Terrill entitled Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for
Military Forces in a Post-Conflict World. In an appendix to this monograph, the authors provide
a “mission task matrix” that is broken down
into 21 categories of “essential missions that
must be performed to maintain a viable state
and change the regime [in Iraq].”7 Though the
monograph is focused on the war in Iraq, it is
possible to generalize from the subset of reconstruction tasks that the authors provide and
draw on them for the purposes of this discus-
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sion of COIN. The full range of tasks in this
monograph is connected to phases of overseas
military intervention that run from decisive
operations through transition. Their listing of
reconstruction tasks are grouped mostly into
four categories—establish security, stabilize,
build institutions, and hand over.
A hard and fast definition of reconstruction that is
based on a specific set list of tasks is neither possible
nor desirable. The goal of establishing a concept of
reconstruction should be to clarify without too much
specificity and gain a common understanding that can
be accepted and used for planning and preparing for
as well as execution of reconstruction activities, while
at the same time avoiding description that is so broad
that it provides no help. Therefore, reviewing the discussions contained in the aforementioned sources, it
seems that reconstruction tasks might best be thought
of in terms of two basic elements of reconstruction that are
related to its purposes:
The first element consists of those tasks that are focused on meeting the immediate needs of the population, to win their support and preclude the possibility
of insurgents taking advantage of grievances associated with basic needs in order to bolster their cause or
make them an accelerant of the insurgency. The primary focus of such tasks is the population. They have
to do with those needs that are immediate and pressing, and they are generally easy to identify and diagnose in the early stages after an intervention. They are
also generally best dealt with at the local (as opposed
to the national) level.
The second element corresponds to the category of
reconstruction tasks generally focused on strengthen-
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ing legitimate institutions, authorities, or processes
and patterns of the host nation. These tasks are focused on fundamental or structural issues—be they
the ones having to do with administration or governance, economics or financial activities, public safety
and the rule of law, or the like—and generally require
an in depth understanding of cultural, social, and political patterns and characteristics of the host nation.
They lend themselves only to longer-term efforts to
build capacity in the host nation’s institutions and are
generally best addressed by host nation officials with
the assistance of technical experts from the counterinsurgent force.
A Scheme of Reconstruction.
In order to achieve synchronicity of reconstruction
activities and integration with other activities that
are critical to a successful COIN effort, there should
be some agreement between all the agencies about a
general sequence that might guide the reconstruction
effort. In describing COIN campaigns, FM 3-24 provides the somewhat stark analogy of patient care to
describe a general sequence of events or rough stages
of a COIN:
• first, stop the bleeding
• then, assist recovery during inpatient care
•	finally, bring the patient to self-sufficiency that,
in medical terms, occurs during outpatient care.
In their discussion of a mission matrix that can be
applied to COIN, Crane and Terrill propose thinking
about the transition phase of that war in terms of four
steps that are related to reconstruction.8 These steps
should not be viewed as rigidly sequential; in fact, if
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they are executed that way the effectiveness of the reconstruction effort will likely be undermined. But a
general scheme of reconstruction that can serve as a
useful guide is derived by making some connections
between the mission matrix in the SSI study and the
discussion in FM 3-24 as follows:
Stop the Bleeding. Establish security: Offensive operations against the insurgent and other military actions to establish (or restore) stability are the supported
effort. The reconstruction effort is the supporting effort,
and it is focused primarily on the population to provide for immediate needs—humanitarian relief, emergency assistance, and restoration of essential services.
Quick impact, visible improvements, early wins, and
making maximum progress during the “golden hour”
(to use another medical analogy) are critical to success
in this phase.
In stopping the bleeding, the early stages of an
intervention present both opportunities and dangers.
In most cases, this is the period characterized by the
greatest turmoil, disorder, and often violence. But it is
usually also the time when the insurgent has had the
least opportunity to exercise control over or influence
the majority of the population. Here is when “reconstruction under fire” is most applicable. The ability
to attend to the immediate needs of the people in the
early stages of a COIN can be decisive. In this stage,
while military forces are attacking the insurgents to
break their momentum, dismantle their networks, and
reduce their ability to threaten the population, the reconstruction effort should best be focused on attending to the immediate needs of the population for civil
order, relief, essential services and the like.
Inpatient Care; Stabilize the Patient. Stabilize the
situation: The supporting/supported relationship
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depends on the level of instability that obtains. As military operations shift from offensive actions against
the insurgent to securing the population, establishing
civil security, and restoring order and authority, the
reconstruction is primarily focused on host nation security and governance at the local level (for example,
the rule of law and the administration of key government services, especially jobs programs).
Build Institutions. The supported effort is capacity
building. The security effort is focused on building
military and police institutions and operations to protect the population and secure key capacity building
activities. The reconstruction effort targets infrastructure, the economic and business sectors, establishment
of the rule of law, and then moves to education, medical services, and commerce.
According to FM 3-24, during recovery while in
inpatient care, the focus of the overall COIN effort is
stability. Combat operations to protect the population continue, but security of reconstruction activities,
especially capacity building, is also a priority. Capacity in the security sector is built through training and
combined operations and patrolling. Other reconstruction activities build upon efforts undertaken in
stage 1 (stop the bleeding) and begin to turn to capacity building activities. Programs are implemented
to strengthen governments so that they are able to
provide for the needs of the people and are viewed
as effective and legitimate. Infrastructure capacity is
rebuilt so that temporary efforts to stop the bleeding
can be replaced by means that are more permanent
and reliable and are run by the host nation. Efforts to
restore self-sustaining economic and commercial activities, especially at the local level, are undertaken.
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Outpatient Care; Getting the Patient Ready for Discharge. Handover: Both the security and reconstruction efforts are focused on establishing competence,
capability, effectiveness, and reach of the legitimate
host nation governments and preparing them to take
full responsibility for the key functions.
The last stage is movement to self-sufficiency. In
this stage, U.S. combat operations are winding down
and being turned over to a host nation military that has
acquired the capacity to assume the responsibility for
conducting them. A concomitant effort on the reconstruction side would see capacity building activities
drawing down and responsibilities for key activities
being turned over to strengthened local and national
institutions. Training for maintenance and operations,
and other activities that support a smooth transition to
host nation responsibility are a priority.
Responsibilities.
This component of a concept for reconstruction in
support of COIN has been the topic of much acrimonious debate. This is especially true when discussions
turn to which tasks are inherently military and which
should be the responsibility of civilian agencies. Of
course, there are also disagreements between individual civilian agencies about the allocation of responsibility for specific tasks among them, but that matter is
beyond the scope of this chapter. Finally, there are often disagreements among agencies about which tasks
should be left to the host nation and when the host
nation should assume those tasks.
Any discussion of responsibilities must begin with
the relevant guidance that is contained in national directives. NSPD 44 states clearly that:
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The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all
U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization
and reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State
shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or
ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum
of conflict.9

And later that:
The Secretaries of State and Defense will integrate
stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans
with military contingency plans when relevant and
appropriate. The Secretaries of State and Defense will
develop a general framework for fully coordinating
stabilization and reconstruction activities and military
operations at all levels where appropriate.10

Drawing from the NSPD, DoDD 3000.05 provides
guidance that is taken to implement the operative
provisions of NSPD-44 for the DoD. Its purpose is
described as “[to establish] DoD policy and assign
responsibilities within the Department of Defense
for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and
support stability operations pursuant to the authority
vested in the Secretary of Defense.”11 Though the directive is entitled “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” the following key paragraph in DoDD 3000.05
seems to indicate that the responsibilities of the military will at times go well beyond support:
Many stability operations tasks are best performed
by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals.
Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to
perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain
order when civilians cannot do so.12
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If this guidance is to be interpreted literally, then
U.S. military forces entering COIN operations today
are not prepared to meet the demands of reconstruction in COIN, and it is inconceivable that they ever
will be able to be so prepared. A realistic guide to the
readiness of military units for reconstruction in COIN
can be based on the following principles:
•	Military reconstruction efforts are most usefully focused on attending to immediate needs
that support wining the hearts of minds of the
population and that will facilitate combat operations against the insurgent.
•	Concurrently, even before civilian agencies are
able to fully implement reconstruction programs, the military must focus on reconstruction tasks that will set the conditions for success
of these civilian agencies. Many of these tasks
will be related to gathering and managing key
information that will be essential to the success
of subsequent civilian efforts. Therefore, close
coordination with those agencies whose efforts
will follow is essential.
•	The military has very little experience with or
expertise in most tasks associated with capacity building of host nation civilian institutions.
Rebuilding or strengthening these institutions
consists of mostly civilian tasks and should be
left to civilian agencies. The primary military
responsibility in this area will be to secure the
effort, which implies that commanders understand the manner in which civilian agencies
carry out capacity building and other related
reconstruction activities.
•	Notwithstanding the desire to put responsibility for reconstruction goals into the hands of
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the host nation (or put a “host nation face” on
them), doing so should be a lower priority than
gaining and keeping the support of the population through a successful reconstruction effort,
especially in the early stages of COIN. U.S. civilian and military activities must coordinate
closely in the effort to pass responsibility for
accomplishing critical reconstruction objectives
to the host nation.
Assessment.
The final element of a concept for reconstruction
is assessment. The weaknesses of current assessment
regimes that have been relied upon in order to measure effectiveness have received enormous scrutiny,
especially in Congress—which is to be expected given
that the ongoing reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan
and Iraq account for billions of dollars of appropriated funds. Beyond the need to ensure that valuable
resources are being put to good use, accurate assessment of the effectiveness of a reconstruction effort in
support of COIN is a critical contributing factor to
successful execution. The ability to gauge the relative
impact of different reconstruction activities and make
timely adjustments is critical to effective COIN, just
as the ability to adjust indirect fires can be critical to
successful maneuver.
The most fundamental challenge has been to decide what exactly to measure. The simplest approach
has been to measure inputs—resources that are being
dedicated to the reconstruction effort. Input measures
have been much maligned, but are still relied on heavily because data to support them is the most reliable
and readily available. And it is not inconsequential
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to know what portion of resources made available is
actually being put to use, when and at what rate, and
where the specific areas of focus are.
Output measures have also been relied upon to
gauge the progress of reconstruction. The number and
types of projects started and completed, time to complete, number of persons trained or graduated from
various educational programs, and other similar measures also have some utility, especially in measuring
efficiency or the return on resources expended.
Universally acclaimed as the most desirable assessment methods are those that measure outcomes in
terms of the desired effects of reconstruction programs.
The most sought after of these are the ones that provide insight on effects that are tied to overall campaign
goals, that is, the progress of the COIN itself. There
has often been disagreement on which indicators are
the most relevant to this purpose. Military organizations tend to judge the outcome of reconstruction efforts based on the effect on levels of violence, number
of attacks, and other indicators of insurgent activity.
Civilian agencies prefer to use survey techniques and
methods to measure the satisfaction of the population
with their living conditions and with the institutions
of national governance.
In his study “Measuring Progress in International
State Building and Reconstruction,” Rick Barton from
the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) advocates a deliberate review of current assessment regimes.13 He notes that existing programs
lack even the basic essential elements that will yield
meaningful measures of progress—clearly established
baselines, mechanisms that will allow for the measurement of trends, and relevant capabilities to gather
data and information being the most important. His
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approach argues for assessment that is based on a mix
of input, output, and outcome measures and accompanying methods to support their collection. Most
importantly, he provides examples that have proven
useful in tracking progress in Iraq and Afghanistan
that are based on trends and the movements of a few
key variables in those counterinsurgencies over time.
A last thought: Measurement of progress of reconstruction in COIN must be tied closely to the two
distinct purposes of the effort—that is, gaining the
support of the population for the counterinsurgent
and addressing the fundamental causes of the insurgency. Measures that correlate to progress in the first
are more likely to be outcome measures that gauge
the degree to which hearts and minds are being won.
Output measures of capacity building efforts addressing fundamental causes of the insurgence, such as
increases in productivity and effectiveness (or lack
thereof) in targeted national institutions and organizations, should not be dismissed out of hand in favor
of attempts to find outcome measures in this area,
which are elusive and often lack relevance. Counterinsurgent coalitions that have the capability to compare various reconstruction courses of action in terms
of the positive effects achieved in both areas, and incorporate those assessments in their planning, will be
more likely to plan, prepare for, and execute more effective COIN campaigns.
ORGANIZING AND MANAGING THE
RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT
In COIN, perhaps more so than in any other type
of full spectrum operation, success depends on the
ability to tailor execution to the specific conditions
encountered in the area of operations. Therefore the
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organization of the instrumentalities of control and
management of the important actions in COIN is key.
Design that permits flexibility, quick adjustment, and
responsiveness without sacrificing unity of effort, coordinated and coherent execution, and the ability to
integrate all the capabilities inherent in the counterinsurgent coalition to the greatest effect is the ideal.
Given the number of players involved, the characteristics of the operational environment, differing
views on the core purpose of the reconstruction effort and the role it should play in COIN, and the wide
range of tasks associated with these purposes, it is no
surprise that management has been a huge challenge.
This situation has not been made any easier by the
fact that, with the exception of the institution of one or
two transitory and usually ad hoc arrangements, there
has never been an established controlling authority to
manage or execute reconstruction in COIN. The lack of
any established structure for managing a reconstruction effort has led to confusion, a lack of coordination,
friction, and disagreement over approach that has
been evident in recent experiences in reconstruction
efforts that are part of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Multiple tales of waste, duplication of effort, bureaucratic infighting, and general ineffectiveness in
the reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan are
well-documented.14 Many of these problems could
be addressed if there was an established reconstruction architecture to manage the effort at three critical
levels.

94

ORGANIZING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FOR
RECONSTRUCTION IN COIN OPERATIONS:
THE POLICY LEVEL
Much has been written and numerous studies have
been undertaken to review how the U.S. Government
should organize for stabilization and reconstruction
operations such as those that would be undertaken as
part of COIN. The fundamental weakness at the level
of the U.S. Government that currently stands in the
way of conducting coordinated reconstruction efforts
in COIN is the lack of any effective body that has the
capability to “lead, coordinate and institutionalize
U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize
and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or
civil strife”—which is in fact a quote taken from the
mission statement of the State Department’s Office
of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).15 It is interesting to note that, despite
the fact that the Department of State has been directed
in NSPD-44 to lead the interagency effort, and DoDD
3000.05 acknowledges that role, the mission statement
for S/CRS mentions coordination of only “civilian capacity.”16
Of course, S/CRS could never aspire to manage a
reconstruction effort from Washington. But it could
ensure that the policies of the agencies that participate
in reconstruction are harmonized, that procedures
that they employ are consistent, and that the departments maintain the capabilities required to meet the
requirements to support overseas operations such as
the two COIN missions that the United States finds
itself in today. Working closely with the DoD, this
type of organization could also play a key role in the
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interagency planning process as the nation prepares
for possible contingencies throughout the world.
Established in 2004 to create a more robust capability within the U.S. Government to prevent conflict
when possible, and if necessary manage stabilization
and reconstruction operations in countries emerging
from conflict or civil strife, S/CRS has languished in
the Department of State ever since. It has experienced
chronic problems of staffing, resourcing, and inattention, ensuring that to date it has not been able to even
come close to meeting its ambitious mission statement
or stated objectives.
S/CRS has also been assigned a key role in resourcing reconstruction efforts that, if realized, could
prove to be the most important steps taken in Washington to improve reconstruction in COIN. The lack
of experienced, qualified, rapidly deployable civilian
experts has ensured that reconstruction in COIN will
fall short of the mark. In both the 2006 National Security Strategy and his 2007 State of the Union address,
President George W. Bush called for the creation of
a civilian response corps (CRC)—a sort of equivalent
of the military reserves—to help fill the serious gap
in the U.S. Government’s civilian reconstruction and
stabilization capacity.17
Since that time, and continuing during the Obama
administration, some initial steps have been taken to
stand up the CRC. But until full funding and other
support can be achieved, an ability to execute the
rapid deployment or surge of civilian reconstruction
experts will be severely limited, which will hamper
the conduct of reconstruction in COIN operations.
Past experiences have proven that the so-called “civilian surges” get going only slowly, are difficult to sustain, and most positions are difficult to fill. When they
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are filled it is largely by military personnel—generally
reservists activated based on specialties acquired in
their civilian professions.
ORGANIZING THE RECONSTRUCTION
EFFORT IN THE COIN THEATER
Given the number of players involved in stability
and reconstruction operations, mounting a coordinated effort in support of a COIN operation would be an
extreme challenge even if there were a standard for
organizing the reconstruction capabilities in theater.
During the U.S. experiment with Civil Operations
and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) in
Vietnam, there was an organizing concept for stabilization operations that actually existed and functioned
fairly well. One might assume that reconstruction lessons learned in Vietnam are being applied broadly in
COIN today. Sadly, that is not always the case, and
currently there are even more actors involved in reconstruction than there were in the days of CORDS.
The organization of CORDS was based on a fully
integrated, civil-military structure throughout the Republic of Vietnam in all four corps areas of operation,
with a CORDS official serving in the chain of command as a counterpart to the military commander at
each level. At the time of MACV Directive 10-12 which
directed the establishment of CORDS, Robert Komer
was designated a deputy to the force commander,
General William Westmoreland, and as such his position in the chain of command nominally carried 4-star
authority. At the tactical level, CORDS had provincial
and district teams, usually headed by civilians, who
coordinated closely with the commanders of U.S. tactical units and with the advisory teams that worked
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with Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units
at the division, brigade, and battalion level. This structure of CORDS facilitated internal coordination of the
reconstruction effort across the theater, and coordination of the reconstruction effort with combat operations being conducted by United States and ARVN
forces. (See Figure 5.1.)
MACV Div 10-12
28 May 1967
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Figure 5.1. CORDS Structure.18
There has been no real impetus for adopting a
similar integrated structure to manage the reconstruc-
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tion effort in COIN today. As the results of the war
game described in Chapter 4 demonstrated clearly,
and consistent with experience in the field, there are
numerous civilian agencies performing reconstruction tasks with no mechanism to coordinate their efforts with each other, much less ensuring that they are
synchronized with combat operations of either U.S. or
host nation forces.
An analog to CORDS would see close linkages
between U.S. tactical units, imbedded training teams
working with host nation forces, and civilian agencies
which are executing the reconstruction program in a
COIN environment. However, the coordination that
is accomplished in current overseas operations is usually accomplished by means of informal relationships
without established systems or procedures—always
at the mercy of breakdowns in communications, interagency friction, and interpersonal dynamics.
It is entirely possible, and often occurs, that in the
same region tactical military units are conducting
combat operations while managing Commander’s
Emergency Response Program (CERP) projects, at
the same time as Army National Guard Agricultural
Development Teams are working with local farmers,
USAID implementing partners are conducting capacity building programs with local governments, Corps
of Engineers project managers are in oversight of
contractors who are doing construction for projects
requested by various U.S. military units and civilian
departments, provincial reconstruction teams are doing quick impact work at the request of the governor,
host nation businesses or local governments may be
undertaking other efforts, while international organizations (IOs) and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) are undertaking their missions. Though the
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chances are fairly good that some of these organizations know what some of the others are doing, there
is no mechanism to guarantee that that is the case,
and any meaningful coordination is generally just a
happy coincidence. And there is certainly no method
(or in some cases no desire) to harness these efforts in
support of combat operations against insurgents or to
protect the population. Given this lack of any structured arrangements to manage the reconstruction
effort, there is a huge loss of opportunity to achieve
important COIN goals.
This was exactly the case in Iraq when in the summer of 2006 the Multinational Force, Iraq undertook
a series of combat operations designed to stabilize
Baghdad and check the rising violence in the capital
city of 7 million (1/4 of Iraq’s population) in an operation that was at first known as the Baghdad Security
Plan, later to be called Fardh al-Qanoon (roughly “Law
and Order”). At the beginning of this operation, the
reconstruction effort that was to support combat operations against Al Qaeda in Iraq and win support of
the population was disjointed, verging on incoherent.
There was no complete, common picture of all the reconstruction projects that were going on in Baghdad at
the time of commencement of the campaign (August,
2006). Given the almost complete lack of reconstruction situational awareness, harnessing the reconstruction effort in support of the Baghdad Security Plan
was virtually impossible.
In response to the Force Commander’s guidance to
address this situation, Multinational Corps, Iraq and
the Gulf Region Division of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers devised a system to gain situational awareness and rationalize decisions being made on reconstruction projects in Baghdad in order to ensure that
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they were tied to the overall COIN campaign there. A
Joint Planning Commission (JPC) was established that
immediately began to collect data from all agencies
and activities that were involved in the reconstruction effort—tactical commanders spending CERP;
the Baghdad Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)
spending Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund monies;
USAID undertaking several projects and programs to
build capacity in Baghdadi infrastructure and local
governments; the Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division, Central which was managing several
projects requested by various customers; and several
others. Iraqi participation in the JPC was initially episodic, but over time it began to grow. Deputy Prime
Minister (DPM) Salam Zigum Ali al-Zoubaie participated in JPC meetings, or had representatives with his
proxy present at the various proceedings. The Baghdad
Amanat (roughly a city council) was also represented
as were local officials from the various beladiyahs
(neighborhoods). The JPC compiled a data base that
identified all the reconstruction work that was going
on in Baghdad at the time and maintained an accurate
and current status of each. The Committee also met
on a weekly basis to review the data and make recommendations on future work to be undertaken, based
on the needs of the local population and synchronized
with the combat operations being undertaken by the
Multinational Corps, Iraq. The meetings were initially
hosted by the Multinational Corp’s Effects Manager
and the Deputy Director of the Iraq Reconstruction
Management Office. Later the meeting was chaired by
one of DPM Zoubaie’s assistants.
The JPC process made it possible to gain situational
awareness of the reconstruction effort as it was being
undertaken across Baghdad. Locations of projects and
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their status, previously unavailable, were now passed
to key military and civilian decision makers on a real
time basis. Individual agencies and organizations were
not bound by the recommendations of the JPC, and,
albeit in rare cases, sometimes chose to go their own
way on certain projects. A significant shortcoming of
the JPC was the absence of a decision support system
or assessment mechanism to accurately predict the
outcome of specific reconstruction projects, measured
against the effects desired by the Ambassador and the
Force Commander for their campaign.
In the end the JPC model was never replicated for
areas of operation outside of Baghdad and the closein provinces that were the area of operations of Fardh
al-Qanoon. No official records of the composition of
the JPC or its processes or procedures were ever kept.
There is no official document that captures these techniques and procedures employed that might be used
as a model for the interagency community or for the
military in future operations.19
THE LEVEL OF EXECUTION
Finally, and perhaps most critically, is the task of
coordination of the execution of a reconstruction effort in support of a COIN at the local or tactical level.
It is there where the most critical coordination goes
on and where the specific knowledge and understanding of the matters most critical to the reconstruction
effort reside. There must be a common understanding among the agencies of who the influencers are,
their needs and desires, and what the people need
and want. There is also a need to have information
on projects and programs and good visibility on how
they are supporting each other and being coordinated,
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what type of progress is being made, and what effects
are being achieved. If agencies are operating at the
local level in a coordinated fashion and staying abreast
of capacity building that is taking place at the national
level, there will be opportunities to extend the reach of
the central government by mentoring and encouraging local officials to work with the central government
to make sure that the needs of their populations are
being considered in national decisions.
To this end, during the reconstruction effort that
was part of pacification in Vietnam, the organization
of CORDS lent itself to just such coordination. The
teams at the local level were drawn from the key agencies involved in the development and reconstruction
communities. As part of the District Team, they had
the ability to work together to ensure that their efforts
were coordinated. Additionally, they worked as part
of a larger organization, reporting to Provincial Advisors, and as an integrated part of the military chain of
command. Though by no means absolute, the authorities of those responsible for reconstruction at the local
level were at least linked to the authorities of the Force
Commander’s Deputy for CORDS, Robert Komer.
Drawing from this CORDS construct there could
be an organization designed to bring coherence and
integration to interagency efforts to execute reconstruction on the ground in present day COIN operations. It might be built from the existing interagency
provincial reconstruction teams that have been established in both Afghanistan and Iraq whose stated purpose is threefold:
1. Increase provincial stability through international military presence and assist in developing nascent
host nation security and rule of law capacity.
2. Assist the establishment and improvement of local government, including its connection to the central
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government and populace, by advising and empowering stakeholders and legitimate governing bodies,
influencing “fence sitters,” and countering obstructionists and spoilers.
3. Facilitate reconstruction at a pace that begins to:
• Provide basic services.
• Provide an economic system that supports
the people.
• Gain popular buy-in for change and support
of representative government.
• Ensure popular expectations for international assistance are met or abated.
In general they are organized as shown in Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2. PRT Core task organization

104

The specific purpose of these teams has evolved
over time and has never been established in any official document. Even today, in practice each provincial reconstruction team effectively decides for itself
what its mandate will be.21 If agencies of the U.S. Government involved with reconstruction and stabilization activities were to recognize the PRTs as having
responsibility for the coordination or integration of
reconstruction activities (they do not do so now) and
grant them the commensurate authority (which they
do not currently have) they could easily become major
players in the overall COIN effort.
Recently in Afghanistan, Ambassador Karl Eikenberry has issued guidance that establishes a Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) for Regional Commands
East and South. The SCR will act on behalf of the Ambassador and have the responsibility to “. . . coordinate and direct the work of all USG [U.S. Government]
civilians under Chief of Mission authority within the
region, ensure coherence of political direction and
developmental efforts, and execute U.S. policy and
guidance.”22 The SCR will have an interagency staff
to assist with this mission. This team’s primary purpose will be to “enable civilians to utilize flexible tools
and tailor programs to the COIN challenges of each
specific environment.”23 Though seemingly a sound
organizational move, the effectiveness of the SCR will
depend on his authority and his relationship with the
agencies which will be executing the reconstruction
effort in specific provinces and districts, especially
those in the military.
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CONCLUSION
Starting with the statement of purpose of NSPD 44
which ties reconstruction to promoting “the security
of the United States through improved coordination,
planning, and implementation” and reinforced in
various implementing documents, there is no doubt
that reconstruction should be a top priority for the
interagency community. But after directing the Secretary of State to “coordinate and lead integrated United
States Government efforts”24 and assigning certain
general responsibilities to supporting agencies, the
document leaves open some fundamental questions
about reconstruction and stabilization, among them
the development of an agreed upon interagency approach or concept of reconstruction and the general
methods and modalities that it will entail. Any proposal to modify or reform the Army’s approach to
executing or integrating reconstruction activities in
COIN operations will necessarily be undertaken in the
context of how these broader issues are approached
by the interagency community. Yet it would be unwise for the Army to delay needed changes until the
interagency approach is further developed. Certain
prudent measures can be taken now that will enhance
the Army’s overall ability to conduct successful COIN
and perhaps set the course for needed interagency reform. A discussion of these measures is the subject of
Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 6
ENHANCING ARMY CAPABILITIES
FOR RECONSTRUCTION IN
COUNTERINSURGENCY
The Army has embraced counterinsurgency theory
and doctrine, and the important role that reconstruction plays therein, with gusto. But where some success
has been achieved in counterinsurgency (COIN) in ongoing operations, among the various explanations that
have been offered for that success, the reconstruction
effort hardly figures at all. Attacks to dismantle terrorist and insurgent networks; the ability to secure and
protect the population, especially in the urban centers;
successful reconciliation efforts—these are what are
most often cited as factors that have been critical to
winning COIN campaigns. Rarely does anyone hear
about a reconstruction effort being part of the reason
for success in any COIN campaign. On the contrary,
several notable military leaders have observed the
failure of the Army to adapt to the full range of requirements—especially the nonlethal ones—required
for success on the COIN battlefield. For example,
General Peter Chiarelli wrote of his experiences in
Baghdad in 2003:
From an organizational perspective, the Army has
successfully created the most modern, effective set of
systems for rapid execution of combat operations on
the planet. We can achieve immediate effects through
command and control of our organic systems. What
we have not been able to do is create the systems and
processes to execute the nonlethal side as effortlessly as
combat operations. Our own regulations, bureaucratic
processes, staff relationships, and culture complicate
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the ability of our soldiers and leaders to achieve synchronized nonlethal effects across the battlespace. Our
traditional training model, still shuddering from the
echo of our Cold War mentality, has infused our organization to think in only kinetic terms. This demands
new modalities of thinking and a renewed sense of
importance to the education of our officer corps.1

Assuming that we believe our doctrine and value
the lessons of history and the thought of eminent theorists and practitioners of COIN, it will be important
for the Army to look for ways to make reconstruction
a more effective component of COIN operations—to
increase the likelihood of successful campaigns and to
reduce some of the toll that COIN is taking on our service members. There are some fundamental reforms
that must be considered that could add significantly
to Army capabilities to conduct reconstruction. Some
of these involve the interagency reforms that were
touched upon in Chapter 5—the most important being a shared understanding of a reconstruction concept across agencies, roles and responsibilities that are
more appropriately assigned to and accepted by them,
and an enhanced operational focus in those agencies
which are instrumental to reconstruction that would
allow them to deploy in greater numbers earlier in a
campaign. The Army must look hard at its capabilities
to participate as a key partner in the interagency effort, and to act alone when that seems appropriate or
necessary. The Army could take steps to improve its
capabilities to conduct reconstruction in the following
areas:
• Improve preparation for reconstruction in
COIN.
• Build more capability in Army units to execute
key reconstruction tasks.
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• Improve the Army’s ability to set conditions for
the success of interagency partners.
PREPARATION
The interagency community has shown time and
again a remarkable lack of preparedness to conduct
integrated activities of any type, reconstruction included. In recognition of this weakness, military commanders have established interagency task forces at
each combatant command (COCOM) to develop various contingency plans that include consideration of
all lines of operation.2 Though the exact nature and
details of these contingency plans are classified, it
seems reasonable to assume that such organizations
are taking steps to assist in preparing forces (mostly
Army and Marine forces) for contingencies in which a
COIN operation is likely.
Reconstruction Preparation of the Battlefield.
This preparation should proceed from some sort
of reconstruction annex to the overall COIN campaign plan. All appropriate agencies should contribute to writing the annex, and it should serve as a useful guide for designating responsibilities, objectives,
timelines, and assessments ex ante. An analog to the
Army’s highly successful process known as “intelligence preparation of the battlefield” might provide a
useful baseline for the preparation of this annex.3
The annex should include as much information
and data as possible about the infrastructure in an
area or country as it currently exists—water, electricity, and sewage—for major cities and for national
systems, and the locations and state of maintenance

111

of key nodes, facilities, and major lines. Accurate descriptions of key national institutions that will likely
become the object of capacity building attempts, such
as the judicial system and the state of law enforcement, will be a critical part of the annex. Economic
information would allow planning for development
efforts that might later become a component of the reconstruction plan. Religious and cultural sites could
be identified and added to the plan which might later
afford a military force an opportunity to leverage the
understanding of these to the advantage of the counterinsurgency effort.
The reconstruction preparation of the battlefield
might also include a surveillance plan that assigns
reconstruction survey objectives—information needs
that should be filled as a first order of priority in the
reconstruction process and can be assigned to early
entry forces. Reconstruction agencies will have specific information requirements that are often either unknown or insufficiently specified to U.S. forces as they
initiate operations in a COIN environment. Assigning
requests for information to reconnaissance elements
(perhaps with augmentees from various agencies responsible for reconstruction who are embedded with
the first arriving units) could be an important step in
meeting these needs.
Training.
Beyond some limited training of PRTs that is being
conducted by the Army, there is essentially no integrated interagency training of the personnel from the
various agencies that will take part in reconstruction
activities in support of COIN. Notably lacking is any
training of the key officials who will perform man-
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agement duties at the operational or theater level to
ensure that the overall effort is coordinated and appropriately integrated with other operations that are
ongoing in support of the COIN campaign plan. When
Army headquarters are preparing for deployments to
COIN theaters they have virtually no opportunity to
work with any representatives from the interagency
community with whom they will work to implement
reconstruction projects and programs. With the exception of the occasional advisor who turns up to present
a seminar on how to work with the interagency community or interjects a helpful comment in that regard
during the course of a mission rehearsal exercise or
a Battle Command Training Program event, civilian
reconstruction experts are largely absent from Army
training.
The Army has requested more realistic participation from the interagency community in exercises like
this, but has yet to make such participation a priority.
Until it does, the training of those who will manage
the reconstruction component of a COIN campaign
will remain suboptimal.
Preparation at the tactical level has been somewhat
better, but still requires improvement. PRTs are the
primary interagency entities that are charged with executing reconstruction at the tactical level. Currently
the Army has undertaken the training of PRTs that
are deploying to Afghanistan as a mission; U.S. Army
Forces Command is executing that training. Though
the training regimen is relatively thorough for military PRT members, civilian members of the team only
participate in a short portion of the overall program,
and many training seats dedicated to civilian officials
go unfilled. As regards the PRTs deploying to Iraq,
there is currently no interagency training to speak of.4
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Finally, the Army should do a careful review of
unit training of military units at home to ensure that
they are prepared for reconstruction activities. DoD
directives and Army doctrine indicate that Army
soldiers and leaders need to be prepared for a wide
range of reconstruction tasks, but there is currently no
training doctrine that can serve as a basis for a training program to prepare tactical units to perform those
tasks. Combat task training is done in accordance with
prescribed sets of tasks, conditions, and standards
that guide commanders who are preparing their units
for deployment. No analogous approach for reconstruction is possible given the dearth of published
material on reconstruction that is either distributed
or sanctioned by the Army’s Training and Doctrine
Command.
ADDING RECONSTRUCTION CAPABILITIES
TO DEPLOYING ARMY UNITS
To even consider adding reconstruction related
capabilities to Army units, the first step will be to
decide which reconstruction tasks Army units will
really be expected to tackle. DoDD 3000.05 and current
Army doctrine notwithstanding, it is not realistic to
expect that Army units need to be ready for any of the
full range of these tasks. Results of the tabletop exercise
described in Chapter 4 track closely with the Army’s
recent experiences in COIN operations: Upon their
arrival in new areas of operation units find themselves
dealing with a population that generally has a discrete
set of immediate needs that units are currently ill
prepared to address. In some cases, resourceful
commanders using ingenious ideas have hit upon
adequate solutions to some of these needs. In other
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cases, military leaders conclude that the problems go
beyond their ability to handle, and action is deferred
until the appropriate civilian agency is able to assist,
which is generally not soon enough to have the desired
effect in the time frame when solutions could be most
useful.
Capabilities Required.
Numerous descriptions of COIN warfare describe
the importance of seizing the opportunities presented
in the initial stages of the operation to gain support of
the population by attending to their most basic and
pressing needs. This is especially important if the insurgency threat develops in the wake of a larger conflict. Adding some key capabilities that are either imbedded in the military units that are early deployers
or readily available to them as they begin COIN operations could aid them immediately and in the longer
term in their efforts to marginalize the influence and
reduce the appeal of the insurgency.
Lessons learned and the accounts of experienced
practitioners in recent COIN operations, such as those
who participated in the tabletop exercise described in
Chapter 4, generally indicate that once security has
been established in a region, neighborhood, or village, many of the most immediate needs of the people
might be addressed in the near term by units with the
capability to provide the following:
• Electric power that could be generated at several
locations simultaneously or distributed from a
central source to several locations.
• Supplies of clean drinking water or water purification capability.
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• Equipment and materials to do small scale construction, excavation, digging, and repair to
damaged buildings, homes, or other structures.
• Medical teams with access to medicines and
supplies and the expertise that is relevant to local health issues.
• Expertise in local government, public administration, and jobs programs who can assist with
getting these activities started or back in place.
• Basic development assistance matched to the
nature of the local economy, for example, agricultural experts who can provide on the spot
help with crops that can be grown and harvested quickly, or veterinary care in rural areas.
Bringing these capabilities to bear in a timely and
coordinated fashion has been a real headache for leaders of Army tactical units as they are configured today. Brigade combat team (BCT) commanders that
have been faced with these reconstruction challenges
have generally had to improvise to find the right types
of equipment and personnel with the expertise to assist with these immediate needs. Commanders have
purchased generators and distributed them to local
townspeople. A commander will look for the soldier
(often one of the reservists in the attached Civil Affairs detachment) who has been a city manager, for
example, and put him to work assisting local leaders
who are tackling tough public administration tasks.
Managing the collection and delivery of the kinds
of capabilities that can have a quick impact has been
handled as an additional duty for some bright captain
in the BCT operations center. However, to date, the
success stories have most often been the result of individual initiatives, resourced in an ad hoc fashion, and
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implemented based on the best estimate of effects by
relatively junior commanders.
A BCT commander faced with the myriad demands of a COIN operation would benefit greatly
from the assistance of a command and control element
that is able to organize and integrate the reconstruction component of the overall COIN effort. A reconstruction support organization, properly manned and
equipped, with a headquarters that is able to organize
and bring to bear the capabilities that are most sought
after by the local people and have the highest impact
on the COIN operation immediately after the arrival
of a counterinsurgent force, could have a decisive impact on a COIN campaign.
Providing the capability to execute a reconstruction effort that can be conducted in a coherent fashion,
that is guided by a command and control element responsive to the overall campaign plan and to the tactical commander, and that is supported with capabilities resident in a unit whose mission is reconstruction
and is organized and equipped accordingly, would be
to take a step in the direction of enabling commanders to accomplish what the Army’s doctrine demands.
The ability of a local commander to provide relief of
this sort on short notice and to sustain it in his area
of responsibility could also have a decisive impact on
gaining the support of the local population.
Money as a Weapons System.
A special type of capability that is resident in Army
units is the funding available to commanders for reconstruction purposes. In COIN operations today, the
techniques and procedures involved in identifying the
sources of funding, using those funds in an effective
and timely manner, and taking the appropriate steps
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to account for the use of them can be as important as
the tactics of a combat operation. Given this fact, it is
surprising to see how little has been written officially
for commanders about how to use “money as a weapons system.”5
Commanders have found the funds provided under the auspices of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) to be especially useful. The
CERP provides tactical commanders with the ability
to “respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects within their area of responsibility by
carrying out programs that will immediately assist the
population.” CERP provides funds directly to a commander that he can spend for appropriate uses.6 In
most cases, CERP funds can be had much more quickly than some of the other funding made available for
reconstruction. Laws and regulations that govern its
use also allow for much more discretion at lower levels then comparable monies available to civilian agencies. The CERP has proven to have profound impact
on the conduct of COIN.
But the recent use of CERP has raised certain issues that suggest that spending has gone well beyond
the original intent for the program. The original idea
was to allow commanders to fund smaller, time sensitive, quick impact, high profile projects that could
assist in winning the hearts and minds of the local
population. Though there are no specific limits on the
dollar amounts, the types of projects envisioned were
of the variety that would not burden tactical commanders with the requirement to do extensive project
management—a capability that does not reside in tactical units. In July 2009 the Special Inspector General
for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) released an audit of
one of the largest CERP projects in the history of the
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Iraq War—a $4.2 million hotel located near the Baghdad Airport. This project was approved by the MultiNational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) commander, and there
are multiple ways that it can be seen as of benefit to at
least some portion of the population of Baghdad. But
the SIGIR audit does raise the question of whether the
CERP program has grown beyond its original intent,
and, if so, whether or not the appropriate guidance
should be reviewed and changed. There are also numerous construction problems noted in the report that
are attributable to inadequate project management. If
it is anticipated that CERP will be used to fund projects of this magnitude, then the Army will have to determine how to get appropriate project management
capabilities to the commanders who are contracting
for large projects such as this one.7
There is also a rising tension between the demands
of proper oversight as it applies to CERP spending and
the initial intent to allow commanders the maximum
amount of flexibility possible to get CERP projects
initiated. In some units, systems and procedures are
so complex and time consuming that much of what
was seen as the benefit of the CERP has been lost. On
the other end of the spectrum, where units have not
applied proper oversight, there have been some notorious cases of fraud, waste, and abuse in the CERP.8
Recently, public attention has been called to the use
of the CERP for purposes that may be in violation of
congressional mandates that are tied to the Congress’s
responsibilities and authority to appropriate specific
amounts of money for certain types of reconstruction
activities abroad. Quite understandably, Congress
views with a jaundiced eye any independent decisions
of tactical commanders to use CERP funds that could
be interpreted as a means of circumventing congressionally mandated limits.9
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The CERP was intended to be a short-term program to assist tactical commanders in their efforts to
win over the local population in their area of operations. It has proven such a powerful tool in the hands
of skillful commanders that Congress has regularly
extended the program. It behooves the Army to review the CERP on a regular basis, lest improprieties or
abuses cause the cancellation of a truly cost effective
“weapons system.”
ARMY CAPABILITIES TO SET CONDITIONS
FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE CIVILIAN EFFORT
Some might conclude that this area needs no real
discussion—that the military need only provide security, and civilian agencies will take care of the rest. But
even this topic of providing security for reconstruction activities deserves specific attention. It may be a
mistake to simply assume that Army units which are
trained for other types of full spectrum operations
have prepared for protecting reconstruction activities
as a set of “lesser included” tasks. Additionally, there
are some very capable systems that the Army already
uses as a matter of course that with minor modifications and improvements could be of great assistance
to an interagency reconstruction effort, especially
since civilian groups currently have nothing comparable at their disposal.
Reconstruction Reconnaissance.
Armed with a list of requests for information from
civilian agencies, early entry forces could put some of
their reconnaissance elements and assets to work with
a specific focus on what it is that the key players in the
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reconstruction effort will need to know before they
arrive. Ideally, civilian agencies would send planners
forward with the early entry forces, who could take
the answers to these questions and begin an interagency estimate that would be available for use once
full teams are able to deploy and the security situation
permits them to begin operations.
The proceedings of the tabletop exercise described
in Chapter 4 yielded an excellent sense of the types
of information needs that civilian agencies will have
upon arriving in theater. One of the players representing the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) submitted an extensive list of requests for
information about factors bearing on reconstruction
that might itself serve as a template for early arriving
units to use as part of their first reconnaissance missions.10 Some initial answers to these questions might
be available prior to the first entry of deploying forces
if a thorough “reconnaissance preparation of the battlefield” of the sort described above were available.
“Reconstruction scouts” accompanying early deploying units might only have to update this baseline data
to provide as complete and current an estimate as possible to agencies and activities that will follow.
Direct Assistance to Humanitarian Relief
Operations.
Though strictly speaking not a reconstruction task,
crises involving refugees can have a dramatic impact
on reconstruction efforts and on COIN operations. Often units taking part in a military intervention will encounter large movements of refugees who have been
uprooted by violence or instability and have taken
refuge and sought shelter and sustenance in refugee
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camps. Army units have at times found it difficult to
assist in solving the problems associated with these
camps because of the magnitude of the effort involved
and because many of the nongovernmental or international relief organizations refuse to cooperate with
military forces. But large movements of refugees create a significant destabilizing effect and the refugee
camps may become breeding grounds for insurgent
activities.
Of course, the preferred method of addressing
the flow of refugees is to address the conditions that
are causing them to flee in the first place. A successful COIN operation that includes a focused, skillful
reconstruction component can go a long way toward
achieving that end. But having a plan and maintaining a capability to address a refugee crisis prior to
a military intervention seems prudent for virtually
any conceivable scenario for regions where an insurgency threatens. This plan might include preexisting
arrangements and agreements with other agencies
whose mission set includes response to humanitarian
crises, even if these arrangements can only be brokered
through third parties.11 Such arrangements would be
useful to determine what types of support to a relief
effort should be planned. Stocks of relief supplies and
equipment that are required to support these plans
should be assembled and maintained so that they are
ready for deployment in accordance with the agreements that have been made between the combatant
command and its service components.
Currently, there are legal restrictions in place
that limit the ability of commanders to provide relief that is paid for with appropriated funds unless
specific authorization for such assistance is written
into the language of the appropriations legislation.
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Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, cautions
that using U.S. Government supplies and equipment
for humanitarian relief purposes is subject to requirements for significant coordination with and approvals
from the Departments of Defense and State.12 Part of
the preparation for COIN missions might include the
accomplishment of as much of this coordination and
receiving as many of those permissions as allowable
prior to a deployment.
Systems to Manage Reconstruction in COIN—
Situational Awareness.
The Army Battle Command System (ABCS) has
revolutionized the way that military units gain and
maintain situational awareness and has greatly assisted commanders at all levels to make better informed
decisions. The ABCS gives commanders a near real
time picture of the location and status of virtually
every combat system on the battlefield. This has
brought an order of magnitude increase in the ability
to integrate the effects of various battlefield systems.
Given its importance to a COIN operation, it is time
to include key information about reconstruction activities into the integrated picture of the battlefield, to
ensure situational awareness and provide support to
decisionmaking.
First, there is a need to maintain a base line of
information that is relevant to reconstruction for nations and regions where there is a contingency plan
for a COIN operation, or for any other contingency
that might require a reconstruction effort. This baseline data will be critical at the national or theater level
and also at the local level as commanders establish
their areas of responsibility (AORs) and, in conjunc-
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tion with civilian agencies, begin their reconstruction
projects and programs in support of the COIN campaign. During the conduct of operations, it will be
necessary to maintain an accurate and updated common operating picture of the work that is being done
by the counterinsurgent force and the host nation to
address the various needs of the population. An automated reconstruction management system should
be developed that allows organizations and agencies
to post and access information about all projects and
programs that are being undertaken—locations, status, timelines, and other critical data. Maintaining this
data as part of the suite of battle command systems
that are currently available in military command posts
will assist in efforts to integrate the effects of reconstruction with other types of operations and activities that make up the larger campaign. Naturally, the
utility of such a system will depend on the number of
agencies and organizations which are willing to post
their reconstruction information to the data base. The
Army should take the lead on the effort to develop the
reconstruction management system, develop means
by which other agencies involved in reconstruction
can gain access to it, and set the protocols so that other
agencies can make their contributions to keeping the
common operating picture current.13
Systems to Manage Reconstruction in COIN—
Decision Support.
Decisions such as those on the type and location of
a reconstruction project or program in a COIN campaign generally depend on a number of variables—
where the greatest impact can be achieved in terms of
improved performance, output, or capacity; receptivi-
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ty and desired effects on the population who will benefit from the effort; considerations as to the balance of
the benefit to various sectors within the population, be
they ethnic groups, tribes, or other types of communities; cost of the program or project; and numerous
other considerations. Commanders at the operational
and tactical level have often found themselves lacking a method of analyzing multiple variables that bear
upon a decision that they must make about a particular project or program. As a result, critical decisions
about reconstruction are often made in a partially informed fashion, based on one or two of the most obvious variables, without consideration of promising
alternatives or any analysis of the full range of effects
that are likely to result.
This situation could be addressed if the Army were
to develop a decision support program specifically designed to assist with reconstruction decisions. Such a
program could be designed around a set of considerations that should be accounted for by a commander
in a particular COIN environment, which could be
the basis of a series of successive iterations. Using an
electrical system that brings power to a district in a
commander’s area of responsibility as an example, the
first iteration of such a program might tell the commander which electrical projects should be undertaken to bring the maximum benefit to the most neighborhoods while still getting power to, say, a central
market place. The second iteration might answer the
same questions, and bring in another consideration
that the commander deems important, for example,
maintaining an equitable distribution of electricity between neighborhoods in the district based on ethnicity
or tribal makeup. Successive iterations might bring in
more nuanced factors about desired effects that could
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possibly be based on survey data. For example, the answer to a question such as “which neighborhoods rank
electricity as the number one quality of life factor and
how can we get the most power there with minimal
reductions elsewhere?” could affect a commander’s
decision on which projects to undertake. Answers to
such questions might support decisions about providing service to areas where the population is most (or
least) inclined to support the COIN.
As with all battle command systems, this type of
support to reconstruction decisions depends on sufficient, accurate data of the right type, and can never
substitute for the part of decisionmaking that derives
from the art of command and the commander’s instincts drawn from his personal assessments. But given the complexities involved with reconstruction in
COIN and the difficult choices that relatively inexperienced commanders must make in this environment,
it seems useful to consider some form of decision support that allows for more thorough analysis and comparison of alternative approaches in the limited time
that is usually available to make these decisions.
Tactics for Combined Reconstruction Operations.
Once operating in an environment where multiple
agencies are present in the same battle space, military
forces are allocated to secure reconstruction efforts
as they are available, given other security and COIN
operational requirements that must be met. Civilian
agencies repeatedly cite security as being the most
important requirement that the military must fulfill
before they can operate. The only other means available to civilian agencies to secure their reconstruction
activities is provided by civilian security contractors
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who are expensive and have a poor record of conducting their operations in a manner that is consistent with
the basic principles of COIN. Thus military commanders often must consider security missions for reconstruction activities as having a high priority among
the multiple demands for forces that are placed upon
them in COIN.
But military units rarely have the opportunity
to prepare or train with civilian agencies to understand their standard procedures for operations in
these types of missions. So when called upon to provide security for a reconstruction mission, they have
a natural tendency to default to conducting security
operations the way they have trained for combat operations in a purely military environment at home station. This may or may not be appropriate to the needs
of the civilian reconstruction team operating with the
unit. An example of the type of mission that can cause
problems is the military convoy that includes a civilian reconstruction team. Small unit tactics generally
dictate that, upon receiving fire, the unit returns fire
immediately to gain fire superiority and then maneuvers to destroy the threat. Clearly, if the mission is to
secure the reconstruction team, there are other considerations that must be taken into account when reacting to contact in a situation like this.
Any action that the Army takes in a COIN operation that enhances the ability to provide security to
civilian agencies, and in turn allows them to focus on
the timely and effective accomplishment of tasks that
will address basic human needs, restoration of services, development, and building capacity in local institutions should be viewed favorably by all involved
in the campaign. The first step might be to establish an
integrated concept of operations for civilian and mili-
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tary players involved in COIN—a recognized scheme
of reconstruction that specifies some standard approaches to the delivery of reconstruction benefits to
a local population. Such a scheme might be described
as a visualization of how civilian agencies generally
prefer to operate and the small unit tactics that can
best be employed to support these civilian activities.
A recent RAND study delves into this notion of
conducting reconstruction under fire at the local level
and proposes some sample operational patterns that
could be a start point for the development of a scheme
of reconstruction. This sort of common framework
would increase familiarity between agencies about
their respective ways of doing business (which is uneven among Army units and commanders), support
the development of a common taxonomy (which currently does not exist), allow for more focused training of COIN forces (unit training of reconstruction
operations rarely occurs), facilitate the ability of military commanders to establish priorities, and allow for
smarter and more efficient choices when it comes to
allocating forces and resources in COIN.14
Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
As previously described, provincial reconstruction
teams are small, interagency teams that have been established to support COIN in both Afghanistan and
Iraq. The size of PRT’s varies from location to location, ranging anywhere from 10 members to over 100.
PRT’s in Afghanistan are commanded by military officers; those in Iraq have Department of State leadership. Agencies represented in PRT’s vary from one to
the next, but all generally have a core consisting of
military, Department of State, and USAID members.
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The mission of the PRTs has been articulated several times by different agencies, never exactly in the
same way, and rarely in official documents. The fact
is that currently PRTs use the mission statement only
as a rough guide to their activities and many interpret
their mission in different ways. For the most part, they
develop their own priorities and work plans and do
their own assessments of their performance and the
progress that they are making.
Multiple agencies providing the people to man the
PRTs have assessed the worth of the program and the
challenges that they have faced.15 But the most pressing problems are all related to one factor—no department or agency owns the PRT program. As a result,
there is no approved doctrine or operational guidance
for PRTs except that which is developed in theater, no
coherent training program to prepare teams or their
members to operate as part of a PRT, and a makeshift
method of resourcing them that has been found to be
wholly inadequate by PRT commanders and key leaders.
Despite these issues, the potential for PRTs to make
a major contribution to a coherent, integrated reconstruction effort at the local level is significant—they
are the only interagency operational entity charged
with coordinating and executing the reconstruction
effort of the multiple agencies at a local level that
work in parallel with the efforts of military commanders operating in the same area.
The most important step that the Army could
take to help PRTs realize their potential would be to
take ownership of the program. Securing proponency
would allow the Army to shape PRT missions and
organizations in such a way that they could better
support the overall COIN effort. The Army could de-
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velop doctrine for PRTs, coordinate the conduct of the
full course of training and preparation for teams and
members, support their deployment, and ensure sufficient resources are made available. The Army may
wish to consider building the program around the
embedded PRT (or ePRT) which has been a concept
employed in Iraq and was judged as extremely successful by commanders there. ePRTs are composed of
members from multiple agencies, but instead of operating from a separate location, they live and work
directly with tactical commanders, greatly facilitating
the coordination of an interagency reconstruction effort at the tactical level.
CONCLUSION
Critics will object to the forgoing recommendations, citing the need for the Army to “stick to warfighting” and not get entangled with “nation-building.” Certainly, for several reasons, it would be a
mistake for the Army to take steps that would lead to
attempting to take on broad capacity and institution
building tasks. First, it takes away from the military’s
ability to set the security conditions that are critical
to the success of the overall reconstruction effort.
Second, the military lacks the corporate expertise to
provide useful advice and assistance in these areas
and will never be able to develop the types of relevant
skills that are resident in civilian agencies. Third, in
cases where the military faces the tradeoff between
the near-term benefits of winning hearts and minds by
delivering for the people and the longer-term type of
capacity building that will eventually lead to the host
nation government’s ability to address some of their
own fundamental problems, military leaders have

130

tended to defer to the near-term efforts, at times at the
expense of the overall capacity building effort.
Wide-ranging though they may be, the above recommendations are based on a conceptualization of a
strictly defined role for the Army, developed in this
monograph, which would take place within a well-coordinated and well-executed whole of government reconstruction effort in support of COIN. As discussed,
there is a limit to how much of the reconstruction load
we should expect an Army unit to shoulder itself. But
there is no limit to the stake that Army forces have
in the benefits that can accrue from successful reconstruction in COIN.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
Even under the best circumstances, reconstruction
in counterinsurgency (COIN) is a difficult endeavor.
The most critical tasks are numerous and complex.
Many participating agencies must undertake missions
that fall well out of their existing core competencies
or operate in environments that are completely unfamiliar to them. The involvement of multiple agencies
which are not accustomed to working together makes
coordination difficult. And all of this must take place
in an environment where an armed, violent foe who
understands the disadvantage to him of a successful
reconstruction effort, is determined to go to almost
any length to resist progress or destroy what has been
accomplished.
In an assessment of an ongoing COIN operation,
General David H. Petraeus observed that “hard is
not hopeless.”1 Extending his logic, it can be said that
reconstruction in COIN is hard, but it becomes less
hopeless if the counterinsurgent understands what
needs to be accomplished and to what end, and he has
a plan and can mount a coordinated effort to execute
that plan. Chapter 1 of Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, concludes with the introduction of some
“paradoxes of COIN” that are designed “to stimulate
thinking, not to limit it.” Herewith in order to stimulate thinking and make hard less hopeless are some
paradoxes of reconstruction.
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In Coin, Time is on the Side of the Insurgent, but
Reconstruction Takes Time.
COIN forces place a premium on quick results and
actions that will produce effects before the grip of the
insurgency can take hold on the population. Reconstruction activities, especially those that are designed
to build capacity in host nation institutions, are generally time intensive. The need to show some progress
in short order can, at times, overwhelm the strategic
patience that is required to fully implement projects
and programs that can bring lasting reform.
Reconstruction Requires Security, But
Reconstruction Is an Important Precondition to
Addressing Security Problems in a Given Battle
Space.
Military commanders, especially, will perceive reconstruction as a key factor in influencing the populace to support the COIN, gain cooperation, and separate the guerrilla from the population. Therefore, they
will push for reconstruction projects as early as possible to assist with their efforts to win over the population and establish security. Civilian agencies that have
not trained or prepared their personnel to work in a
combat environment will quite naturally push for the
best security conditions possible before initiating any
major reconstruction efforts.
If You Build It, They Will Come.
Reconstruction creates additional security requirements. A promising project presents a great information operations opportunity for the counterinsurgent
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to show the benefits of cooperation. But it also creates
a target for the insurgent that he otherwise would not
have had—an opportunity to undermine the credibility and the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent and the
host nation.
Reconstruction Raises Expectations, Which
Sometimes Means that They Have Farther to Fall.
Once it becomes known that the United States has
taken on the tasks associated with improving the way
of life of the population, expectations rise quickly.
And when raised in this manner, expectations never
recede; who can believe that a nation that “put a man
on the moon” would be unable to sustain the delivery of essential services to a handful of families? And
unmet expectations are the grist of dissatisfaction on
which the guerrilla thrives.
Reconstruction Breeds Dependency in the Host
Nation, and Dependency Has a Corrosive Effect on
Legitimacy, Which Is the Main Objective of
Counterinsurgency.
Even if limited to a short period of time, providing
the type of assistance that is delivered to a host nation
as part of a holistic reconstruction program during
a COIN operation runs the risk of creating a dependency in the government that the counterinsurgent is
attempting to assist, especially if that government is
weak to begin with. This dependency can be used by
the insurgent as a weapon to assist in making the case
that the host nation government is ineffectual, undependable, and reliant on the assistance of outsiders to
perform even the most routine functions of government.
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Effective Reconstruction Empowers and Brings
Legitimacy—Sometimes to the Wrong Leaders.
Bias or corruption in government can often be used
by the insurgent as an accelerant or a means to gain legitimacy for his cause. If the benefits of reconstruction
are viewed by the population as propping up a corrupt or criminal leader, the counterinsurgent stands to
lose. Additionally, it is often the case that the benefits
of reconstruction in an area that is poorly or corruptly
governed or administered never trickle down to the
people, which will do no good and perhaps cause
great harm to the efforts of the counterinsurgent.
Drawing directly from FM 3-24: “Some of the best
weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot.”
The narrative that expands on this paradox in FM
3-24 centers on a discussion of “the lasting victory that
comes from a vibrant economy, political participation,
and restored hope,”2 and sums up in a concise and
catchy way many of the main points related to reconstruction that appear in current Army doctrine.
Of course, the unspoken corollary to this paradox
is: Even as a weapon that does not shoot, reconstruction can end up being dangerous to the hunter as well
as the hunted. The counterinsurgent’s ultimate objectives are a manageable security environment and
strong national institutions that have the confidence
and the support of the people. A coordinated, skillfully executed reconstruction program is essential to
those ends. But reconstruction that is mismanaged,
bungled, and obviously ineffectual not only represents a lost opportunity to advance the cause; it also
may well put a weapon in the hands of the insurgent.
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